

**Qaisar Ali**

Peoples' Friendship University Moscow Russia (RUDN), Department of Humanities and Social Sciences & Abdul Wali Khan University Mardan

ISSN: 3006-6557 (Online)

ISSN: 3006-6549 (Print)

Vol. 3, No. 3 (2025)

Pages: 58-68

Key Words:

Gaza, Israel, United States, Jerusalem, China, Russia, United Nations

Corresponding Author:**Qaisar Ali**Email: kaisarzubair@gmail.com**License:**

Abstract: *This article explores the international dynamics of the Gaza war, focusing on how global powers align, intervene, and utilize international aid as a strategic instrument. It examines the positions of key countries that support either Israel or Palestine, analyzing their actions through the lens of Realism, with supplementary insights from Anarchism. The study argues that while states publicly justify their involvement through humanitarian or legal principles, their actions are largely influenced by geopolitical interests, historical narratives, domestic pressures, and strategic alliances. Countries such as the United States, and the United Kingdom provide military and diplomatic backing to Israel to maintain regional dominance and economic leverage. The research further discusses how international organizations, including the UN and ICC, play both active and symbolic roles in shaping the discourse, often constrained by great power politics. By mapping the political gains pursued through aid, diplomacy, and international alignments, the thesis provides a comprehensive understanding of how the Gaza conflict has become a global arena of competing interests, identity-driven agendas, and contested norms of international order. Through a Realist lens (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), this article analyzes the Gaza War (2023–present) as a global power contest where states prioritize strategic interests over humanitarian or legal principles. Evidence—including U.S. military aid (\$3.8B/year + Elbit contracts; International institutions (UN, ICC) are neutered by vetoes or selective enforcement, while neutral states (e.g., India) prioritize arms deals over ethics. The article concludes that coercive measures (arms embargoes, grassroots governance) must raise occupation costs to force compromise.*

Introduction

The ongoing conflict in Gaza is not a local or regional issue alone. It represents a global geopolitical chessboard where nations take sides, sometimes openly, sometimes discreetly. While the humanitarian crisis intensifies, international aid has become a tool of diplomacy, influence, and strategic leverage. This thesis explores how each country aligns itself in the Gaza conflict, identifying which nations support Israel or Palestine, examining their motivations, and analysing the political gains underlying these alliances. Here we chronicle Israel's military operations in Gaza since 7 October 2023 with a focus on the military technologies that have been used up until the time of writing (September 2024) alongside

details of international political support. Data is drawn from on-the-ground reporting, social media, international media, satellite data, and Israeli military updates. There is a surfeit of information from these sources that cannot be exhausted in the space available here; we rather construct a representative account that emphasises wider dynamics for which there is significantly more data. In lieu of a full and retrospective analysis, our task is to piece together an early draft of evidential record that sets Israel's military deployment in Gaza into international lines of assistance and complicity. (Griffiths, 2024) but international demand: "between October 29 and November 29 alone, Elbit Systems was awarded a US\$135 million contract to establish an artillery ammunition factory for an [unnamed] international customer, a US\$170 million contract from the Swedish Army, and a US\$500 million contract from the US Marine Corps (Griffiths, 2024)

To situate the current classification in a factual context, a very short factual description of the situation in Gaza is given. This section will cover the history of the Gaza Strip (A), the structure and functions of Hamas (B), and the level of influence that Israel held over this territory after its withdrawal in 2005 (C). (FORTIN, 2025)

A. The territorial parameters of the area of land that is now known as the 'Gaza Strip' were first established at the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, when it came under the military rule of Egypt and its boundaries were set out in the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement of November 1948¹³. During and before this war, many thousands of Palestinians lost their homes and were forced to flee from them. An area of land that had an initial population of 80,000 was suddenly inundated by around 200,000 refugees, coming mainly from the rest of the Gaza District and Lydda District. (FORTIN, 2025)

B. Structure and functions of Hamas. In January 2006, shortly after the Israeli withdrawal, Hamas won a majority of the seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council of the Palestinian National Authority (PA). It initially invited Fatah to form a unity government, but when Fatah refused to cooperate, Hamas formed its own government headed by Ismail Haniyeh. In response to Hamas's refusal to recognize Israel, renounce violence and accept previous agreements leading to a two State solution, the international community-imposed sanctions on the PA while the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) declared Hamas a terrorist organization. (FORTIN, 2025)

C. Level of influence exercised by Israel over Gaza despite Hamas's control of the Gaza Strip and responsibility for everyday governance, Israel retained control of Gaza's borders and many of the aspects of daily life. This was despite its proclamation that one of its objectives in withdrawing from Gaza was to formally extinguish its responsibilities to the Palestinian population in this area³¹. It maintained complete control over Gaza's coastlines, limiting fishing and preventing the landing of any boats. Israel also exercised a tight control over Gaza's airspace, preventing the passage of goods and persons by air. It also exercised control over the land borders, deciding when they are open and what is allowed through. (FORTIN, 2025)

Since 7 October 2023, Elbit has massively expanded its operations in support of the Israeli Ministry of Defence. Its factories increased production and expedited the delivery of new systems, drawing on a labour force bolstered by overtime, a recruitment drive, and a programme to bring retirees back into the workplace. (Griffiths, 2024)

Theoretical debate

Anarchism, Israel and Palestine

Anarchism has been a political undercurrent in Israel and Palestine for a century, appearing in three disconnected waves: the libertarian socialism of the early Kibbutz communes, the publishing and cultural activities of Yiddish-speaking immigrants, and contemporary Israeli anarchism. In Palestinian

society there are individual sympathizers but no organized anarchist movement, with Marxist parties such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) leading the secular left wing. Yet the first Intifada (1987–89) drew widespread support from anarchists as a grassroots uprising involving tax refusal, general strikes, urban confrontation, and the establishment of underground schools and mutual aid projects. Since 2000, Israeli and international anarchists have been leading solidarity campaigns in Palestine. (Gordon, 2009)

Realism explains state behaviour in the Gaza conflict through its core tenets of anarchy, self-interest, and power maximization.

States act in their own self-interest, seeking power, security, and survival in an anarchic international system. In an inherently competitive international system (Waltz, 1979), (states align with Israel or Palestine based on strategic gains, not moral principles: the U.S. sustains military aid to Israel (\$3.8B/year) to project regional power and counter Iran (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007); Russia and China leverage pro-Palestine rhetoric to undermine U.S. hegemony and rally Global South support (Scobell & Nader, 2024); while nations like Qatar weaponize humanitarian aid to buy political influence (Ulrichsen, 2022). Even "neutral" actors like India prioritize arms deals with Israel over consistent ethics, confirming Realism's view of aid and alliances as tools of leverage (Farrell & Newman, 2019). States thus instrumentalize the conflict—and its humanitarian toll—to secure survival, resources, or positional advantage (Morgenthau, 1948), exposing the theory's central axiom: international politics is a struggle for power.

Application to Gaza War

Countries support Israel or Palestine based on strategic interests like regional influence, military alliances, and economic gains (e.g., US military aid, German arms sales). International aid is used as a tool of leverage, not purely humanitarian. Political gains like access to military contracts, control over peace negotiations, or alliance-building reflect realist motivations.

Realism is a dominant theory in international relations that views the world as a competitive, conflict-prone system where sovereign states act primarily to secure their national interests, particularly power and security. Realists assume that the international system is anarchic, meaning there is no overarching global authority to enforce rules or mediate disputes effectively.

In the context of the Gaza war, Realism provides a clear explanation of why countries behave the way they do:

Strong Diplomatic & Military Support

I. United States

US Gaza Policy since 2005 In April 2004, President George W. Bush embraced then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan for unilateral Israeli disengagement from Gaza and wrote that "the United States will lead efforts, working together with Jordan, Egypt, and others in the international community, to build the capacity and will of Palestinian institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat that would have to be addressed by any other means." (Goldenberg, 2018) Efforts to Isolate and Weaken Hamas Throughout the years, various attempts were made to reconcile between Fatah and Hamas and help the two sides build a unity government. The goal of these efforts was twofold: end the Fatah-Hamas rivalry and the aid embargo on the PA since the elections. The first such serious attempt known as the Mecca Agreement was made by Saudi Arabia in February 2007 and resulted in a new government that included Fatah and Hamas officials, as well as independents, including Salam Fayyad. Under the agreement Hamas was to handle domestic affairs and Fatah and the technocrats would deal with international

affairs. (Goldenberg, 2018)

II. Political Gains

U.S Foreign aid in Israel after Israel withdrew from Arab countries as part of the peace process, the United States began to provide military aid. Israel was at risk for peace, and Washington considered it an obligation to provide this security aid. In return for their involvement in the peace process, the United States also provided a wide range of aid packages to Egypt and Jordan. To date, the U.S has provided Israel with \$146 billion in bilateral assistance and missile defence money (in current, non-inflation-adjusted dollars).¹⁶ from 1971 to 2007, the United States provided Israel with important financial assistance. However, due to Israel's rapid economic growth since the 1990s, this is mainly done in the form of military aid. According to a 2016 memorandum of understanding, the U.S will provide Israel with approximately \$4 billion each year, including \$500 million for missile defence, indeed, the United States also giving such bilateral aid, migration and Refugees assistance to Israel. (Marcella, March 2022)

III. U. S position in Palestine

Clinton outlined the skeleton for stipulating a Palestinian state and completing the remaining latest status thoughtfulness. The first U.S support for Palestinian state was coming from George W. Bush, which outlined in United Nations'2003 Road Map for Peace by United States, Russia, and European Union. (Marcella, March 2022)

IV. U. S position in Jerusalem

Israel and PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) agreed in the 1993 Oslo Accords, the last comprehensive accord on the subject, that the claim to Jerusalem would be fixed only in final status discussion. Today, Israel considers all part of Jerusalem to be its capital, whereas the Palestinian Authority claims East Jerusalem as their capitals for a future Palestinian state, and considers Israel's occupation of the region to be illegal. To avoid preempting a future peace accord, the US and most other countries having connections with Israel have retained their embassies in Tel Aviv for decades (Marcella, March 2022)

V. U.S position on Israeli

For years, the U.S has officially opposed Israeli settlements as a barrier to peace, but has avoided naming them illegal outright in order to avoid international sanctions on Israel. Despite the fact that a 1978 State Department legal opinion said that Jewish settlements in occupied territory are unlawful under international law, President Ronald Reagan stated in a 1981 interview that the settlements were "ill-advised" but "not illegal. "Most administrations came to bear in mind that in any peace deal, Israel would preserve its three largest accomplishment blocs in exchange for relinquishing other land to the Palestinians, believing that forcing so many of its inhabitants to leave the settlements was unfeasible. The United States, on the other hand, wields the most clout among the Gulf States, Israel, and the European Union (EU), and hence has a unique role to play in this means. As part of this venture, the United States should pressure the Gulf States and the Arab League to openly strain Hamas to accede the PA's competency, as well as boost Qatar's constructive role in supplying aid to Gaza, but ensure that Qatar's message to Hamas is that the Egyptian-United Nations-US plan is only political preference. (Marcella, March 2022)

VI. U. S foreign Aid to Palestinians

United states administration which led by President Donald Trump, suggests that should persuade the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to participate in U.S -led diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. U.S government had continuously espoused the Palestinians in charge of humanitarian

contributions and economic protraction for the refugees in the Near East to UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency).

Reprogramming \$231.532 million in bilateral economic aid for West Bank and Gaza (containing \$52 million for East Jerusalem hospitals) for other purposes in FY2017. - The United States' humanitarian assistance to UNRWA is being phased out. In FY2018, US funding was \$65 million, compared to \$359, 3 million in FY2017. - Choosing to exclude Palestinians from a conflict management and mitigation program (CMM) run by USAID and the US embassy in Jerusalem. Annually, \$10 million is allocated to programs engaging Israelis and Palestinians. - The United States continues to provide nonlethal security aid to the Palestinian security forces, as well as security coordination with Israel, but the majority of Palestinians favour recent PLO proposals to stop the coordination (Marcella, March 2022)

VII. U.S Foreign aid in Israel

After Israel withdrew from Arab countries as part of the peace process, the United States began to provide military aid. Israel was at risk for peace, and Washington considered it an obligation to provide this security aid. In return for their involvement in the peace process, the United States also provided a wide range of aid packages to Egypt and Jordan.

VIII. Migration and Refugees Assistance

Israel has received funding from the State Department's Migration and Refugee Assistance account (MRA) 135 since 1973 to help with migrant relocation.¹⁷ The United Israel Appeal, a private philanthropic organization based in the United States, receives the contributions and distributes them to the Jewish Agency for Israel.¹⁸ 136 Between 1973 and 1991, the US contributed \$460 million to Israel's resettling of Jewish refugees.

Bilateral aid

Proponents of foreign aid not only emphasize Israel's defensive and quality needs, but US aid to the United States and Israel is a mutual benefit, and the continued value of US aid to Israel is shown. They point out that American investments in Israeli defence and non-defence technologies have resulted in advancements in areas like missile defence, energy efficiency, and water supply

Turkey in the Reconfigured Middle East: The Drive for Reconciliation in Gaza.

A month after securing re-election in 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan embarked on a Gulf tour of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, signalling that the Gulf and the broader Middle East will remain key elements of Turkish foreign policy during his third (2023–2028) presidential term. However, significant obstacles are hindering reconciliation, particularly the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Erdoğan's fiery rhetoric against Israel. The 7 October Hamas attack was widely seen as an attempt to disrupt the Abraham Accords and block the normalisation of Saudi-Israeli relations. However, the first direct impact of the crisis was on Turkish Israeli relations. Initially, Erdoğan showed unusual caution, calling for restraint from all sides, signalling his desire to continue the reconciliation efforts he began a year earlier (Çevik, October 2024)

Future of reconciliation following 7 October

If it was not for Hamas' attack on Israel on 7 October and the subsequent Israeli attacks in Gaza, Netanyahu was going to visit Turkey, demonstrating Israel's willingness to continue the reconciliation process. Erdoğan's initial reaction to the attacks and subsequent Israeli retaliations also demonstrated his seriousness about reconciliation efforts with Israel. In the face of the disregard for civilian life by both Israel and Hamas, Erdoğan underlined the sanctity of civilian life and called on both sides to exercise restraint.⁶⁹ Moreover, he reportedly asked the Hamas leadership in Istanbul to leave the country. (Çevik, October 2024) On 25 October, he announced that he did not consider Hamas to be a

terrorist organisation, calling its fighters “mujahideen” (freedom fighters).⁷¹ from that point on, Erdoğan reverted to his traditional stance against Israel, calling the country “a terror state” and accusing the international community of turning a blind eye to Israel’s atrocities. He even threatened Israel, claiming that Turkey could enter Israel as it did Libya and Karabakh.⁷² Moreover, on 3 May, Turkey took the unprecedented step of severing all economic ties with Israel. In the past decade, trade has never been affected by the constant political crises between the two countries and has always been seen as the last bastion of bilateral relations. (Çevik, October 2024)

Collapsed reconciliation with Israel

Turkey’s relations with Israel started to deteriorate much earlier than with other countries in the region. The first major crisis between Turkey and Israel erupted in 2010 after the infamous “Mavi Marmara incident”, in which a Turkish faith-based NGO, İnsani Yardım Vakfı (IHH), tried to break Israel’s naval blockade to the Gaza Strip by delivering aid from the sea. Israeli soldiers boarded the Mavi Marmara – the flagship of the aid convoy – and killed nine Turkish citizens. (Çevik, October 2024)

Gaza, Votes, and Vetoes: Why Erdogan Halted Israel Reconciliation

Thus, in the period after 7 October, bilateral relations declined to a level never seen in previous crises. However, a more careful analysis of how Erdoğan reacted to this war and how and why his position has changed since 7 October reveals that he has tried very hard to avoid this outcome. In sum, Erdoğan has tried to preserve reconciliation efforts while avoiding the perception that he has entirely abandoned the Palestinians.

Egypt draws up Gaza reconstruction plan that would exclude Hamas

An alternative to Donald Trump’s plan to turn the Gaza Strip into a US-owned “Riviera of the Middle East” is being prepared by Egypt, under which Hamas would be formally excluded from governance and control of the territory’s reconstruction. The process would be handed over on an interim basis to the control of a social or community support committee. No member of Hamas would sit on the committee. But the future military status of Hamas within Gaza is unresolved, which is likely to be a barrier to Israeli endorsement of the plan. An Arab summit is due to be held in Riyadh on 27 February at which an alternative to the Trump plan for Gaza is due to be discussed and parts of it revealed. The US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, has not ruled out an alternative to the Trump plan but said: “Any plan that leaves Hamas in the Gaza Strip will be a problem, because Israel will not tolerate that,” and thus would be a return to square one. (guardain, 2025) Egypt plays a careful role as mediator, not out of humanitarian concern alone, but to prevent spill over into its own territory and maintain control over the Rafah border.

Role of GCC States (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait)

The Gulf States are divided. UAE and Bahrain maintain normalized ties with Israel, while others push for ceasefires without fully severing relations.

The outbreak of the war in Gaza in October 2023 may have reintroduced conflict into the region but it has also led to closer coordination in the region as well as within the GCC. While Egypt, Qatar, and Türkiye opposed Israeli attacks and provided a platform for negotiating a ceasefire, Saudi Arabia and the UAE coordinated to highlight the humanitarian toll of indiscriminate strikes by Israel, which killed thousands of civilians in the Gaza Strip. Iran, Syria, and to some extent Iraq challenged Israel directly through their sustained support of Hamas and Hezbollah. (Agarwal, MARCH 2025)

China, Russia

These major powers have called for ceasefires but avoided fully alienating Israel. China and Russia promote a two-state solution and criticize Western bias. India maintains ties with both sides, offering

humanitarian aid while abstaining from UN resolutions.

Wang Yi: China Supports Palestine's Full Membership in the U.N. and Calls for Working out a Timetable and Road Map for the Two-State Solution.

On March 7, 2024, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi elaborated on China's position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict when he met the press during the NPC and CPPCC sessions.

Wang Yi said that the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict has caused 100,000 civilian casualties, and countless innocent people remain buried under the rubble. There is no distinction between noble and humble lives, and life should not be labelled by race or religion. The failure to end this humanitarian disaster today in the 21st century is a tragedy for humanity and a disgrace for civilization. Nothing justifies the protraction of the conflict, or the killing of the civilian population. The international community must act promptly to promote an immediate ceasefire as its overriding priority and ensure humanitarian assistance as its pressing moral obligation. People in Gaza have the right to life in this world, and women and children deserve the care from their families. All detainees should be released, and all actions that harm civilians should be stopped. China firmly supports the Palestinian peoples' just cause of regaining their legitimate national rights, and is always committed to a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the question of Palestine. China supports Palestine's full membership in the U.N., and urges certain U.N. Security Council member not to lay obstacles to that end. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs People's Republic of China, March 07, 2024)

Russia's policy

Russia's policy and behaviour since the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, and Israel's war on Gaza. For years, Moscow's approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict was based on "equidistance" between the two parties—maintaining working relations with the Israelis and pledging friendship to the Palestinians. However, the outbreak of the latest war led Russia to take a clearly pro-Palestinian stance and harshly criticize Tel Aviv's military response. The analysis shows that while relations were strained by Russian officials' anti-Israel statements, Moscow did not fundamentally alter its position. It did not cross Israel's red lines by arming Hamas and other militant groups, nor did it abandon its well-established commitment to the two-state solution. (Šćepanović, 4 October 2024)

Political and Legal Frameworks

International Organizations and NGOs

United Nations, ICC, and Human Rights NGOs: The UN has struggled to pass binding resolutions due to US vetoes. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants against Israeli officials. NGOs highlight civilian suffering and lobby for arms embargoes and legal accountability. Countries like India remain carefully neutral. While condemning civilian deaths, they avoid directly criticizing Israel to preserve defence and technology deals. This balancing act is a hallmark of realism: states pursue pragmatic self-interest, not moral consistency.




Figure (1): Represent the Basics theories and their outcome

Realism explains why countries may condemn violations by enemies but stay silent on allies. For example, the U.S. criticizes other countries for civilian casualties but blocks UN actions against Israel. According to realism, this is not hypocrisy but rational interest-based behavior: protecting strategic allies at all costs.

Realism allows us to see past humanitarian narratives and understand that:

- State behavior is calculated.
- Aid is a tool of power projection.
- Support or condemnation of violence is strategic, not moral.
- The Gaza war is less about right and wrong, and more about who gains what from their stance.

The mass killing in Gaza has been happening daily with no stop, even when Palestinians answered the order of evacuation a few dozen times and ended up living in tents on the road. On the 10th of August 2024, more than 100 Palestinians were killed. Tens were severely wounded while they were praying the Dawn Fajir prayer (5 am) in a UN refugee school sheltering 2,000 children, women and men after being ordered by the occupation to leave their homes to this “Israel”-declared safe zone. The weapon used by the Israeli army turned the men, women and children into pieces, and the remains were kept in plastic bags and given randomly to relatives and asked to assume that this is their loved ones and bury them. (Buheji, 2024)

Global Actor cause for tendency

The Gaza war has magnified global divisions. Some nations support Israel for strategic and economic reasons, while others back Palestine out of ideological, legal, or humanitarian motivations. The conflict illustrates how international aid is often intertwined with politics, diplomacy, and long-term geopolitical ambitions. Understanding each country’s role is essential to navigating the path toward peace and justice in the region. (Çevik, October 2024)

The Basis of Gaza Human Factor Mitigation Strategies

Gaza urgently requires accessible, culturally sensitive mental health services to address widespread trauma, PTSD, and depression. This must be integrated with initiatives to rebuild community cohesion, reduce isolation, and provide social support. Educating communities to reduce stigma and promote understanding is essential. A sustained, holistic approach—combining psychological care, social rebuilding, and justice—is critical for healing survivors and fostering long-term recovery. (Buheji M., June 2024)

Root Cause of the Problem

“Israel” army has been bombing houses, buildings, refugee schools and all shelters Gazans used after being forcefully displaced each time, including cloth and plastic tents sheltering. When bombardment starts, there is basically no safe place to go to, and staying in current location could be as risky as trying to run, as individuals and groups are also targeted while trying to walk away from bombardment. People and especially children, are often under great fear. Many cases of children dying of fear were reported. A survival child from under the rubble. Was featured with no hair stating that she lost her hair when her home was bombed, and family members killed. (Buheji, 2024)

Genocide Reflections on Palestinian Aspirations.

Mother’s Aspiration

Young Palestinian gentlemen asked their mother about what they would do if they returned to Gaza to find it destroyed. Her answer is that we will return to Gaza to rebuild it. we will clean it and build it brick by brick, and we will put all our energy and power to bring it back to better than what it was, till all homes and services are back”. When one of her sons mentioned:” are we going to waste our life in Gaza?” Her answer is:” Gaza is your life. Your honour, inside Gaza, if you leave anywhere, you will live without honour. In Gaza, you will live your real life in your homeland, and you will rebuild it and stand up tall, my son, because Gaza is ours and not for any colonizing power”. (Buheji, 2024)

Young Man’s Aspiration

A Palestinian blogger in his early twenties shows Gaza’s beauty and the rich life they enjoyed in Gaza before the Zionist occupation destroyed it. Then, another video lists what a Palestinian in Gaza is going through every day in search of something to eat and feed his kids. He mentioned staying in the same clothes for more than 20 days, walking for more than 1 km to fill water in whatever containers you can find, and searching for paper and wood waste to use for cooking while eating only beans for more than

10 days in a row. (Buheji, 2024)

International Legal Factors

One of the stark manifestations of this imbalance is the prevalence of gender-based violence against Palestinian women by Israeli soldiers and authorities. Despite numerous reports and allegations, the lack of international legal cases and accountability is a troubling aspect that underscores the broader issue of impunity and systematic cover-ups by the Israeli state. The international community has a critical role to play in addressing this impunity. Current mechanisms for holding Israeli authorities accountable are inadequate, often hindered by political considerations and a lack of robust enforcement measures. Human rights organizations and UN bodies have called for stronger actions to ensure accountability and justice for victims of gender-based violence (GBV) in conflict zones. UN experts have described the violence against women and children in Gaza as unacceptable and have urged for comprehensive measures to protect these vulnerable groups. (Mascha, 2024)

Conclusion

To impose tangible costs that force compromise, the international community must establish a UN General Assembly-mandated Reconstruction Authority (UNGARA)—funded by neutral states (e.g., Norway/Switzerland) and audited NGOs—to depoliticize Gaza aid by bypassing Qatar and the U.S., redirecting resources directly to Palestinian civil society groups. Simultaneously, exploit U.S.-China-Russia rivalries by offering diplomatic concessions (e.g., China hosting peace talks, Russia leading ceasefire monitoring) in exchange for their enforcement of comprehensive arms embargoes on Israel and sanctions against weapons suppliers (e.g., halting U.S. F-35 transfers/German submarine sales). Regionally, deploy an Egyptian-Jordanian peacekeeping force funded by Saudi/UAE Gulf states, conditioning financial support on demilitarizing Hamas through amnesty programs and Palestinian Authority anti-corruption reforms, while linking Arab-Israeli normalization deals to verifiable steps toward Palestinian statehood. To circumvent U.S. Security Council vetoes, pursue universal jurisdiction lawsuits against Israeli officials in sympathetic states (Turkey/South Africa) and refer all actors (including Hamas) to the ICC via UNGA resolution. Finally, condition resumption of Western aid/arms sales on Israel ending settlement expansion and lifting the Gaza siege, while reserving 50% of Gaza's interim governance seats for women/youth coalitions documented in Buheji's resilience studies—thereby converting Palestinian grassroots agency into political power and rendering the occupation's continuation costlier than diplomatic compromise for all realist actor.

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