

**Ijaz Ahmad¹, Ghulam Murtaza Khan²**

1. Department of International Relations, Bahria University, Islamabad, Pakistan.

2. Shaheed Benazir Bhutto University, Sheringal, Dir (U), KPK, Pakistan.

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Corresponding Author:**Ghulam Murtaza Khan**Email: gm khan@sbbu.edu.pk**License:**

Abstract: *This research explores the strategic, geopolitical and economic dimensions of United States foreign policy towards China during Biden's administration. The study adopts a qualitative, analytical approach using secondary sources, and is analyzed through the lens of neoclassical realism. The study focuses on how internal political dynamics and international systematic pressures shape US foreign policy behavior. The study's results show that the Biden's administration has adopted multifaceted and balanced policy approach towards China. This includes "competitive coexistence" strategy of cooperation and competition with China. The authors of the study are hopeful to attract other scholars to further explore the United States foreign policy towards China in future.*

Introduction

The competition between the United States (US) and China has become one of the most characteristic features of international politics in the twenty-first century. The U.S. has been shaken as the largest world power by the rapid economic development, increasing modernization of its defence technology and aggressive actions of China in areas like the South China Sea and Taiwan. To Washington, it is not only the way to protect its strategic and economic interests but as well its liberal and rules-based international order that has formed the basis of its global leadership since the end of the Second World War. This has made U.S. foreign policy with respect to China a focal point by policy makers and scholars who are keen to understand the contemporary world balance of power.¹

It is against this background that the Biden's administration has presented a unique concept as competitive coexistence. Biden, in contrast to the transactions and unilateral approach of the Trump previous policy, has focused on the ideas of alliance-building, multilateralism, and long-term approach to competing with China without taking direct action. In this policy, Washington is emphasizing the efforts to reconcile the realities of interdependence with the needs of strategic rivalry. President Biden in his first major foreign policy speech called China the gravest competitor of the United States, and described the bilateral relationship as a contest between whether democratic ideals or authoritarian

¹ Biden's Jr, Joseph R. "Why American Must Lead Again: Recusing US Foreign Policy after Trump." *Foreign Affairs*. 99 (2020): 64.

models would inform the international system.²

Biden foreign policy vision is based on his previous writings, but most prominently, his 2020 article in *Foreign Affairs*, entitled *Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy after Trump*. He wrote it claiming that America is the only state that can take the lead in the world as long as it regains its allies, reclaims its values and approaches to emerging challenges. His administration has since already brought this vision to life through increased collaboration with partners via programs like the Quad, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and AUKUS, as well as maintaining pressure on China with sanctions, tariffs and military deployments.³

The importance of the approach by Biden is that it is a dual one, preserving the aspects of stability with the previous administrations and introducing new steps based on the diplomacy and building of coalitions and investment in the internal competitiveness. The combination of these two points substantiates the timeless significance of power politics, and the possibility of how perceptions of leadership and the pressures of domestic politics contribute to the country's foreign policy.⁴

Against this background, this paper analyses the relationship between systemic pressures and domestic politics in the context of the China policy of Biden's administration according to the neoclassical realism perspective. The purpose of the research is to offer extensive insight into how the administration manages the U.S-China rivalry, using the theoretical lens including strategic, geopolitical, and economic aspects of the issue and its future implication on the future of the global order.⁵

Main Argument

The central argument of such study is to critically examine the main tenets of President Joe Biden's administration approach towards China, with an emphasis on strategic, geopolitical, and economic competition. The research seeks to highlight the key elements of this bilateral relationship. The goal of the study is to explain the basic principles and strategic objectives that drive Biden's administration approach towards China. In order to counterbalance China's rise, Biden foreign policy places a strong emphasis on power, balance and transition. By examining these factors, the research attempts to present a thorough understanding of Biden's administration's policy and its implications for the future course of US-China relations.

Questions

1. What domestic and international factors have influenced the Biden's administration foreign policy towards China?
2. Why did the Biden's administration prioritize strategic interests in his foreign policy approach towards China?

Objectives

1. To identify the domestic and international factors influencing the Biden's administration towards China.
2. To examine how Biden's administration integrates strategic objectives in its foreign policy framework

² Guillen, Arturo, and Iván Cortés Torres. "The Decline of American Hegemony: Biden's Foreign Policy Towards China." *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy* 12, no. 3 (2023): 247-272.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Johnson, Ian. "Biden's grand China strategy: Eloquent but inadequate. Council on Foreign Relations." (2022).

⁵ "U.S.-China Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, October 2023, accessed November 4, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations>.

Methodology

The study is qualitative and descriptive in nature and utilizes secondary sources as its primary source of data. Since the U.S. dealings with China are rather complex, the qualitative approach is one of the best option as it enables a closer look at the strategic, geopolitical, and economic aspects of foreign policy. In contrast to the quantitative approach, where scholars work with numbers and numerical patterns, qualitative analysis allows researchers to comprehend the meanings, stories, and motives behind the policy decisions.

The theoretical perspective underpinning the study is the neoclassical realism, the focus of which is the relationship between systems pressure and domestic politics. This framework facilitates the application of interpretive approaches to understand the perceptions and reaction of U.S. leaders to the emergence of China. To this end, the study critically examines policy speeches, government documents, think tank reports, and scholarly articles to determine how the Biden's administration has developed its China policy.

The role of an administration in U.S. foreign policy is arranged and presented in a systematized approach to show both continuity and change through the descriptive approach. The research is purely secondary-based using academic journals, policy papers, official statements, reliable news reports, and books by international organizations. Interviews with policymakers were not a viable primary data collection method because of the sensitivity of foreign policy decisions and limited availability to elite officials. However, secondary sources also can offer credible information about processes led by elites and can also help to connect with existing academic and policy discussions.

The gathered data got thoroughly examined, thematically coded and discussed in the context of neoclassical realist. This methodology is coherent in theory, clear in methodology, and rich in empirical data. This combines an approach that is both qualitative and descriptive, providing a wholesome description of the influence of both domestic and international forces on how the Biden's administration has formed its foreign policy towards China.

Problem Statement

The fact that China is rapidly emerging as a world power poses a strategic challenge to US world leadership. Biden foreign policy has reacted with dual track approach of co-operation and competition. Nevertheless, the way this strategy combination responds to the challenge of China in theory and practice was under researched.

Significance of the Research

The study aims to explain how foreign policy approach of a state changes with the changing circumstances at the domestic and international levels. The purpose of the research is to provide a detailed view of the domestic and international policy strategies adopted by the Biden's administration in his China policy. The Biden's administration foreign policy has been based on cooperation and competition in dealings with China. The study will provide a detailed insight of US foreign policy towards China under the theory of neoclassical realism.

Literature Review

The US and China have one of the most significant and complex relationship in the world. Since 1949, there have been periods of conflict and collaboration between the nations over matters related to trade, security, Taiwan, and South China Sea.⁶

China bearing a threat to the US, still regarded as the most dominant power in the world. Moreover, as

⁶ "U.S.-China Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, October 2023, accessed November 4, 2023, <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-china-relations>.

great powers in the twenty-first century, the two powerful states have largely competed in the Indo-Pacific area. There are certain military flashpoints in this region like North Korea, the South as well as East China seas and Taiwan which directly lie under the influence of Beijing and Washington. A Chinese rising economy and military threat are likely to create the opportunity of a power change in the international system where the emerging economy will want more political power, conversely the United States will not allow China to threaten its position at the top of the world order.⁷

Moreover, Joe Biden is concerned about democracy, environmental justice, human rights, and American leadership. During his 2020 presidential campaign, he listed some of his priorities in foreign policy, among which was supporting the core interests of America, ending the wars in Afghanistan and Middle East, advancing diplomacy, resuming affiliations with the global community, restoring devotion to military's control and associating the world in the fight against climate change. Moreover, he underlines that his foreign approaches are the polar opposite of the one Trump is pursuing, particularly when it comes to his commitments to international cooperation.⁸

The Biden's administration has upgraded the Quadrilateral-Security-Dialogue (Quad) to summit level, proposed an alternative infrastructure proposal to counteract China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and, most importantly, identified China as a strategic challenger that is "near-peer" to the United States. These actions are all part of the administration's struggles to fortify ties with allies and partners in Asia.⁹ The United States under President Trump abandoned its four-decade policy of engagement with China, described Beijing as a revisionist vast power bent on subverting the local and global order, levied widespread tariffs on Chinese goods, raised the level of scrutiny of Chinese influence and investment in the US, and initiated a kind of partial decoupling between the two main economies in the world. Moreover, the Trump's administration initiated the first time ever an Indo-Pacific policy that aims to offset or potentially contain the rising Chinese control of the region.¹⁰

President Biden has shifted American diplomacy back from the Trump's administration "America First" approach to the more conventional approach that emphasizes the nation's network of allies.¹¹

US Pivot to Asia

The idea of the pivot—later called the re-balance—to Asia is usually linked to the policies of the Barack Obama administration. The pivot had three main components: institutional, military, and diplomacy (bilateral and multilateral diplomacy). The US National Security Strategy of 2015 was called "re-balance/pivot to Asia," and it was aimed at advancing the nation's realignment to Asia and the Pacific while highlighting its status as a Pacific power. The increasing role of Asia in the world system, especially the economy, security politics specially maritime security in South China Sea and North Korean provocations were also mentioned as the pretexts and objectives of the policy. Developing affiliations with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, particularly with regard to the restoration of democracy in the last country and reinforcing local organizations, likewise the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), East Asia Summit (EAS) and Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), were also other areas of focus.¹²

⁷ Ihsan, Rizky. "Joe Biden's Foreign Policy: What to Expect from the New United States President." 18, no. 1 (2022): 88-98.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Wei, Zongyou, and Yunhan Zhang. "The Biden's administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy and China-US Strategic Competition." *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies* 7, no. 02 (2021): 157-178.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Nobukatsu, Kanehara. "President Biden's Desired Strategy for Engagement with China." *Asia-Pacific Review* 28, no. 1 (2021): 61-79.

¹² Grabowski, Andrzej. "Joe Biden's Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: Change or Continuity. A Comparative Analysis." *Polish Political Science Yearbook* 50, no. 4 (2021): 95-105.

The Indo-Pacific concept is typically used to refer to the policies that Donald Trump's government has undertaken in the region. The US National Security Strategy released in November 2017, included this term. The pledge on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific territory was the central component of this policy. Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea were one of the most significant concerns facing the area.¹³

Asia has been rediscovered in the Biden's administration. According to the administration's national security papers, China is "our most significant strategic rival and the pacing challenge". In this regard, the Indo-Pacific region is a priority theater that is essential to US national security. At long-standing US allies' invitation, President Biden finally traveled to Asia for the first time to participate in the second in-person Quadrilateral Security Dialogue ("Quad") Summit. Biden hosted the US-ASEAN Summit for the first time in Washington before his departure. The significance of Biden first journey to Japan and Korea on his first trip to Asia was centred on his pledge to "reinvigorate" Washington's alliance network upon taking office.¹⁴

Under the administration of Joe Biden, much attention has been paid to ASEAN in Indo-Pacific Strategy. Thailand and Philippine are allies of the US. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were ranked as the three top regional partners. Moreover, it is supported in its attempts to offer long-term solutions to most urgent problems in the region and the role ASEAN plays in it. Preservation of a positive international order, commonly known as the rules-based order, that defends democratic institutions and human rights remains the major target of US policy in Southeast Asia. This is among the main aspects of the US-China struggle in the Asia-Pacific region.¹⁵ Continuity is evident, rather than change, in US policy toward China. Both the US and China pledged to cooperate in this area, but mostly US Asia policy remained unchanged.

South China Sea and Taiwan

The reaffirmation of our commitment to defend our Indo-Pacific allies," Biden emphasized the United States commitment of being a committed upholder of autonomy of navigation and airflights, commitment to global law, and the maintenance of stability and peace in the South China Sea and East China Sea. The Biden's administration has responded to this by restating American belief in the power of international rules and in particular the United-Nations-Convention on the Law-of-Sea (UNCLOS) in addition to the necessity to maintain associated rule-based international order. The U.S. has tried to reinforce its armed presence in the Indo-Pacific and deter Chinese aggression with regular freedom of navigation operation (FONOPs) and maritime armed exercises with its allies, such as Japan, Australia and Philippines. All these are under the broad Biden policy of integrating military, foreign affairs, and multilateral weapons to counter the Chinese intention to occupy the region.

According to President Xi, Taiwan is our "core interest". He has demonstrated a connection with Taiwan in an objective of "national rejuvenation" and unification with Taiwan. China has significantly expanded its military, economical, and diplomatic influence of the island during the last seven plus years. In response to this pressure, the United States has strengthened its security and economic connections with Taiwan and maintained high-level contacts with the country.¹⁶

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Cossa, Ralph A., and Brad Glosserman. "WASHINGTON" PIVOTS" TO ASIA." Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 24, no. 2 (2022).

¹⁵ Stepanov, A. S. "US Policy towards Southeast Asia: from Barack Obama to Joe Biden's." Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences 92, no. Suppl 15 (2022): S1473-S1478.

¹⁶ Sacks, David. "Meeting Low Expectations: Analyzing President Biden's Summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping." Council on foreign relations, Number 2023.

According to the U.S. readout, Biden highlighted our one "China policy has not changed and has remained unswerving over the decades and administrations. He reiterated the will of the international community to peaceful solution to the cross-straits issues, the US opposition to any independent change in the status quo by either party and the commitment of the world to peace and stability in the Strait of Taiwan. After the visit to Taiwan by the then-House speaker Nancy Pelosi in August 2022, China cut all military-to-military contact with the US. The US has continually encouraged China to re-establish military-to-military communication, particularly in fear of a potentially explosive encounter between the two armies. Subsequently, President Xi reinstated some of the military-to-military meetings which had been cancelled in 2022.¹⁷

Economic Competition

The US seeks stability through a favourable balance of power, unrestricted trade with Asia, the most dynamic economic area in the world today, and open access to advance US standards and values. China's challenges to US interests in Asia are deeply rooted in American objectives. America was thought to be the most significant and dominant economic force in the region just a few years ago. Though the Obama administration's multifaceted rebalancing policy pledged a sustained commitment to the area, the international economic deal known as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was implemented with US approval. With the administration's trade battle with China significantly disrupting regional manufacturing chains with China, President Trump departed from the Trans-Pacific-Partnership (TPP) and placed economic pressure on important Southeast Asian countries. As a result of the disruption, a small amount of investment from China was moved to Southeast Asia, also South Asian nations increased exports to the US somewhat. However, the trade war and the possibility of economic decoupling complicated economic interactions and increased regional and international uncertainty, which was harmful to Southeast Asian development.¹⁸

China is striving towards a better long-term economic development policy, and a higher profile in the region. By mid-twenty-first century, China is interested in having a prosperous and modernized economy. Made in China 2025 is a popular government-backed industrial strategy that seeks to make China a technology powerhouse by prioritizing key industries including industrial materials, machinery, information and communication. Overall, China has gained ground in the Asia-Pacific region, over the last couple of years, in terms of developing closer bilateral economic relationships. The most notable example is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is the primary focus of the foreign policy of the current administration. It was evident in the development of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank based in Beijing that China was keen to play a significant role in enhancing economic development in the region.

These steps put together provide a clear roadmap to making China more prominent in international governance, particularly in the field of financing development, and elevating it up in the value chain. The US action to introduce tariffs has led to a rapid escalation of tensions between the largest two economies in the world. The Biden's administration is maintaining severe tariffs that Trump put in place, intensifying competition.¹⁹ China uses economic influence over its neighbours as its primary tactic. As part of China's worldwide infrastructure lead, the Belt and Road Initiative, for instance, involves bilateral

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Sutter, Robert. "Biden's First Year: Coping with Decline as China Rises in Southeast Asia." *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2022, 42–59. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27206738>.

¹⁹ Tan, Deborah H. Y.; and Chen Chen. "Modelling the Economic Impact of the Sino– US Trade Dispute: A Global Perspective." In *The Chinese Economic Transformation: Views from Young Economists*, edited by LIGANG SONG, YIXIAO ZHOU, and LUKE HURST, 215–36. ANU Press, 2019. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvp7d4j8.18>.

partnerships that Beijing uses to bring the ruling elites of states like Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia through the guarantee of rapid financial gains.²⁰

China depends largely on exports to the United States and its partner nations for income, imports the majority of its raw materials through chokepoints that it cannot fully control, and has strong reason to fear that these nations might cut off its accessibility to resources and markets in a situation of crisis. China is developing special zones abroad to secure raw supplies and markets that are unavailable at home, and it is reorienting its economy around its home market through the use of subsidies and trade barriers. The US is reacting to these actions with its own push for economic supremacy because they have concerned it. Trade and economy are pushing the two nations farther apart rather than together.²¹ In a complaint to Biden, Xi stated that "China's legitimate interests have been seriously damaged by the United States' continuous measures against it, including investment reviews, export controls, and unilateral sanctions. "It is our goal that the US will finally listen to China, act and remove unilateral sanctions, and provide Chinese enterprises a level playing field. Moreover, president Xi aimed to communicate that China is still accessible for trade."²²

Research Gap

Although the current literature offers a comprehensive amount of information on the nature of U.S.-China relations and outlines the foreign policy aims of the Biden's administration—such as multilateralism, democratic principles, and alliance-building—it lacks specific discussions on how these broad goals are translated into concrete actions. This gap is especially evident when examined through the theoretical lens of neoclassical realism. The majority of the previous studies are inclined either on global geopolitical competition or on certain issues such as trading controversies, military build-up, South China Sea, etc. Nonetheless, less has been done explaining the influence of inner-political forces whereby perceptions about leadership, and popular opinion culture were seen to interact with the system pressures in shaping the China policy of the Biden's administration. The proposed research endeavours to address this gap by using neoclassical realist prism to examine the interrelationship of the domestic and international considerations within the Biden China policy. It also expects to offer a more delicate view of the model used by the administration to balance competition and cooperation and how competition and cooperation strategies impact regional stability and the strategic positions on the United States.

Theoretical Framework

Neo-classical realism is a theory in international relations that attempts to explain foreign policy decisions in terms of systemic factors (such as the allocation of power in the international system) and domestic factors (such as the influence of state leaders, domestic public opinion).

According to neoclassical realism, the relative material power of a nation is the chief determinant of the foreign policy goals and objectives of such a nation. Yet, it says that since unit-level variables likewise state structure and observations of decision-makers need to adapt to systemic pressures, the power capabilities influence the foreign policy adversely. Hence, adequate assessment of both the household and global environment where foreign policy is made.²³

Neoclassical realism acknowledges the parameters of international pressures, elite calculations, perceptions of relative power and domestic constrains. Relative power defines the principles of how

²⁰ Lee, John. "A Paradigm Shift in America's Asia Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, November 2023.

²¹ Beckley, Michael. "Delusions of Détente: Why America and China Will Be Enduring Rivals." *Foreign Affairs*, August 2023.

²² Sacks, David. "Meeting Low Expectations: Analyzing President Biden's Summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping." *Council on foreign relations*, Number 2023.

²³ Rose, Gideon. "Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy." *World politics* 51, no. 1 (1998): 144-172.

states or those representing them determine their objectives and characterize their interests. According to a neoclassical realist paradigm, state authorities must somehow possess a beginning of the nationwide interest in the face of potential external dangers. The anarchic characteristics of the international system require states to consider their security and military intervention is one way that policymakers pursue the aim of ensuring their security.²⁴

Neoclassical realists emphasized the need for certain domestic factors, like as perception of risk, political leadership, domestic institutions to be added to the systemic pressures. According to them combination of systemic and unit level variables is important.

In 1998, Gideon Rose called this form of realism, neo-classical realism. According to the proponents of Neo-Classical Realism (NCR), it is more or less as per its position in the international system, and more importantly, its relative material power capability, that the breadth and ambition of the foreign policy of a given country is determined as said by Rose in his study; Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. However, they are neoclassical because all of the systemic pressures are captured through unit-level superseding variables. The basic assertion of the NCR is that domestic, unit-level attributes affect the capacity of nations to respond successfully to opportunities and pressures introduced by the international system.

Neoclassical realism in the literature of contemporary realism tries to explain state actions through structural as well as domestic factors. Neoclassical realism is the first school of thought to add a new facet to the recognized idea of structural realism that structure is a major factor in modifying state behaviour: structure has to be conveyed to state behaviour via domestic politics and more so via the perception of leadership and elite.²⁵

Overall, the neo-classical realism approach applied to U.S. foreign policy on China under the Biden's administration is associated with the fact that a set of systemic, domestic, leadership perceptions and public opinion issues should be taken into account. How these factors interact will determine how the U.S deals with China, prioritizing a positive balance of power and adjusting strategies to varying conditions.

Internal Political Dynamics

1. Leadership Perceptions

Biden emphasis on "America is back" while Trump puts "America first" are dissimilar approaches. Biden prioritizes partnerships and alliances. Therefore, it is apparent the Biden's administration is reaffirming the necessity for Washington to reconnect with its allies and partners throughout the world and go back to worldwide organizations and policies in order to regain its position as a global leader. The combination of foreign and domestic policy is emphasized by President Biden.²⁶

In a pre-election Foreign Affairs article titled "Why America Must Lead Again," Biden expressed his views on the evolving US national role. He declared, "I will take immediate action to restore democracy, restore US dominance, safeguard the future economy, and once again America will lead the world." He continued, "No other country has that capacity," in response to this pledge. He declared, "The Biden's foreign policy strategy will put the United States back at the top of the table, enabling it to collaborate with partners and allies to initiate collective action on international threats. "As president, Joe Biden proclaimed he would restore American democracy and alliances, put the nation back at the top of the

²⁴ Lobell, Steven E., Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds. Neoclassical realism, the state, and foreign policy. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

²⁵ Tang, Shiping. "Taking stock of neoclassical realism." (2009): 799-803.

²⁶ Chen, Liang_chih Evans. "Pre-assessing the Biden's administration's Foreign Policy: Its Views, Challenges, and Strategies." Taiwan Strategists 9 (2021): 1-17.

table, and lead the world in addressing the most pressing global issues in order to proceed the security, richness and values of the United States.²⁷

2. Domestic Public Opinion

Without a keen appreciation of US domestic politics, it is impossible to know, much less make predictions about US foreign policy. Although the Constitution grants the American president of the federation unusual broad powers in the conduct of foreign policies, both congress and the people place limitations on these powers. In other words, the US presidents of today have never had the ability to support foreign policy objectives without popular backing. It is widely held that domestic politics do affect the US foreign policy decisions. In this regard, social consensus formed part of the choices that presidents make whenever they initiate any meaningful foreign policy programs.²⁸ According to the Biden's administration, the middle class's interests should be close to the centre of US foreign policy. He promised that he would regulate a "foreign policy for the middle class".²⁹

Many believed that Biden approach to dealing with Beijing would be more restrained, nuanced, and comforting. The majority of Trump's China policies have been carried out by the Biden's administration, despite the Biden's administration is more systematic than the Trump's administration in their approaches towards China. As a president, Biden has kept extending the Trump administration's variety of American sanctions against Chinese actions. Priorities for President Biden have included containing the pandemic, boosting the economy, lessening partisanship in government, preventing large-scale protests that jeopardize the democratic process, and defending the rights of minorities. Second in importance to U.S. foreign policy interests in Asia, included close collaboration with partners and allies as well as bilateral solutions to public health, climate transforms and nuclear non-proliferation. Many in the United States, including large sections of the people, corporate executives, state and local governments, and business leaders, have put off in taking a tougher stance towards China, despite the widespread consensus that drives Washington's China policy. Future U.S. policy success relies on the Administration and Congress's ability to develop a plan that addresses enduring domestic issues and contain Chinese threats.³⁰

International Systematic Pressure

1. Geopolitical Concerns

During the past 20 years, China has aimed to lessen the US influence in Asia. Beijing has concentrated on undermining US allies and isolating nations like Australia and Japan in order to accomplish regional goals. The US depends on support and access to the regions of its Asian allies due to its geographic isolation in order to maintain military presence. China has exerted pressure on these nations to neither strengthen their own defences nor make security pledges to the United States, realizing that these nations are vulnerable.³¹ Washington has recently made some progress in an effort to unite Asian allies against Chinese influence. The United States' regional policy has prioritized strengthening current ties throughout the Washington Pivots in Asia. Australia and Japan were the two most cooperative Asian partners of the US and were the first countries with which the Trump's administration began trilateral military cooperation. The Biden's administration has upheld these efforts and enhanced military collaboration with Australia and the UK through the AUKUS pact. Most importantly, allied countries

²⁷ Kim, Dongchan. "The Biden's Doctrine and China's response." *International Area Studies Review* 26, no. 2 (2023): 107-124.

²⁸ Burleigh, A. Peter. "DOMESTIC POLITICS, EXTERNAL ENGAGEMENT, AND LEGITIMACY A Perspective from the US." *Power, Legitimacy, and World Order: Changing Contours of Preconditions and Perspectives* (2023): 3.

²⁹ Gawthorpe, Andrew. "Taking US foreign policy for the middle class seriously." *The Washington Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (2022): 57-75.

³⁰ Sutter, Robert. "Domestic Politics, Congress, and US Hardening to China." (2022).

³¹ Lee, John. "A Paradigm Shift in America's Asia Policy." *Foreign Affairs*, November 2023.

likewise South Korea and the Philippines (who had swivelled against the United States under the two other American regimes) have been persuaded by Biden to shoulder more of the security burden in dealing with China.³²

2. Economic Interests

The tremendous economic growth of China has essentially transformed it in the world and made it more capable of influencing future policies at the international level. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a project that gained growing significance to China and other countries in the Asian region, Europe, and other regions. China has implemented several measures in improving its involvement in the global governance progression. These involve setting up various multilateral frameworks that are in tandem with existing international frameworks and encouraging reformation efforts in established international bodies that are spearheading a massive number of emerging economies. It is characterized by the international system in which China has become institutionalized as manifested by its impressive economic development which is largely determined by the US and its allies. In May 2022, President Biden proposed an in-depth plan to manage the Chinese economic recovery in the Asia-Pacific region. This structure of economic cooperation encompasses twelve countries: the US, Australia, South Korea, India, Japan, Brunei, Indonesia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The proposed plan encompasses infrastructure, taxation, renewable energy, supply chain, and trade. The objective of the International Partnership for Economic Cooperation (IPEF) is to facilitate the reestablishment of cooperative economic contacts between the United States and the Asian nations facing the economic development of China.³³

Conclusions

The Biden's administration has been reflective of foreign policy towards China as great power contest has evolved in the 21st century. This policy is grounded on the background of neoclassical realism, implying that systemic aspects (such as rising economic and military power of China) interact with domestic aspects (such as leadership perceptions and popular opinion). The administration has sought to sustain both cooperation and opposition with Beijing in a policy of competitive co-existence, never falling to open warfare, but cooperating with other powers in international relations, and taking a firm line against Chinese aggressive actions.

Bolstering alliances, advancing multilateral programs, investing in local competitiveness, and selective continuation of Trump era policies such as tariffs and sanctions are some of the essential elements of this policy. In these moves, the focus is on the initiative taken by Washington to sustain its world leadership and in response to the threats of China rising at an alarming pace. At the same time, that coalition-building or rules-based order should be of importance in the administration is, again, a new emphasis on the unitary instincts of its predecessor; it is also markedly seen in the place of diplomacy and in the place of deterrence.

The findings of this research paper show that relationships between the U.S. and China under Biden are more of strategic rivalry than of cooperation, although there are some spheres of cooperation, including climate change and global health. The future of this relationship will be determined finally by the capability of the US to balance domestic politics and international responsibilities. With such a long-term strategy that has not been altered through time, America will be in a more favourable position to defend its security, wealth and global clout against Chinese ascendancy.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

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