From Crime Scene to Courtroom: Investigating Flaws and their Role in Low Conviction Rates in District Dir Lower, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan

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**Abstract:** The effectiveness of police investigation is a major tenet of the criminal justice system. In Pakistan, especially District Dir Lower in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, systemic flaws such as inadequate training, political interference, and resource constraints have been identified as some of the major reasons behind low conviction rates. This study intends to analyze the factors accounting for low conviction rates in District Dir Lower with a focus on low-quality police investigations, witness protection issues, and professional competencies of legal practitioners. Using a quantitative cross-sectional design, data were collected from 261 respondents, including complainants, police officials, public prosecutors, and private counsels. Data were collected through structured interviews schedule using a 5-point Likert Scale. Relationship tests were done using SPSS, including Pearson Correlation and multiple regression. The analysis revealed that there is a moderate positive correlation between the inability of police officials to prove cases and low conviction rates (r = 0.272, p < 0.01) and between defective investigations and low conviction rates (r = 0.312, p < 0.01). The multiple regression model explains that police qualification, age, and level of income are all jointly able to explain up to 27.1% of the variation in conviction rates. The study highlights that weaknesses in police investigations like training deficits and resource lack greatly influence conviction rates. Socioeconomic factors and a lack of adequate legal expertise worsen the scenario creating less public confidence in the justice system. Further recommendations for increasing conviction rates include continuous training of police officers, provision of modern investigative tools, and good synergy with other legal entities; addressing their socio-economic barriers through legal aid and community outreach will help ensure equitable access to justice.

## Introduction

Police investigations are a cardinal pillar of the crimination system globally. Conventionally, law enforcement agencies are the first respondents to the report of a crime all over the world. Major activities include securing the crime scene, preserving certain evidence, safeguarding the public, and starting preliminary investigations (Pakes, 2024). The investigative process may involve combined effort with specialized units like forensic experts, detectives, or medical personnel depending on how serious or violent the particular crime is. Globally, the first two critical steps of a criminal investigation are suspect identification and proving their guilt (Joyce & Laverick, 2022). This involves careful gathering, analysis, and corroboration by witness statements, physical evidence, or confessions. Credible investigations, carried out efficiently with diligence and impartiality, are the foundation that supports the whole criminal justice system. They promote national stability, act as a deterrent to crime, and instill

faith in the public by delivering justice to the victims and punishing the culprits (Mbuba, 2023).

In many states today, the criminal law is codified; and the justice system is primarily structured around the three principal arms: the police, the prosecution, and the judiciary (Lynch, 2014). Whereas these three institutions assist gradually in law enforcement, in reforming offenders and adjudging persons whose lives have been engulfed in the criminal justice system. Access to justice is a basic right, and a transparent justice system is necessary for social cohesion and democratic growth (Lima & Gomez, 2021). The criminal process, therefore, is initiated with an investigation, carried out by police or authorized agencies. Such investigations are controlled by laws which confer powers and define their limits, such as those laid down in Pakistan's Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), from the registering of First Information Reports (FIRs) to arrests, interrogations of suspects, and the submission of evidence to courts (Ahmed & Minhas, 2024).

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In Pakistan, the police investigation system is beset with a multitude of problems that corrode its effectiveness. While the CrPC allows for investigations under sections 154-175, which in practical terms grants the police the powers to investigate criminal offenses, those very powers have been rendered ineffectual owing to practically no resources for proper training and political interference, together with systematic inefficiencies (Iqbal et al., 2023). For example, the station house officer (SHO) must register an FIR without personal bias and arrest suspect(s) without the need for prior judicial approval for cognizable offenses (Kazmi, 2023). These, however, frequently get overshadowed in miscarriages of justice by an inappropriate application of simple procedure and evidence mishandling and improper interrogation. In theory, judicial oversight (e.g., production of an accused within 24 hours and requirement that confessions be made before a magistrate-Sections 164 and 167, CrPC) should protect rights, but in fact, this is often outweighed. As a result, Pakistan has an appallingly low rate of conviction, This, according to Soomro and Soomro (2023), erodes public trust in the justice system; victims are left disappointed, while the acquittals of criminals signify impunity, which further erodes the rule of law (Afzal et al., 2023).

These problems are aggravated in the less developed and rural parts of Pakistan, such as District Dir Lower of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There, one finds very peculiar socio-political and infrastructural challenges for the whole criminal justice system. The police would usually work under a resource bottleneck, coexist among diverse tribal traditions and intense pressures from the influential local actors, and then suffer lack of modern tools for investigation and training, which had also limited their potentials in conducting investigations thoroughly, objectively. Decreased success of criminal prosecution is a great deal compromised, and conviction rates remain low. Therefore, this study aims at linking the gaps in police investigations carried out in District Dir Lower to the failed prosecutions as well as their larger implications towards justice, public trust, and social stability in the region.

# **Literature Review**

Police investigations constitute one of the vital parts of the intricate global criminal justice framework, having a pivotal role in enforcing law, protecting rights, and delivering justice in both developed and developing nations (Pakes, 2024). They are meant to ensure the identification, capture, and prosecution of offenders according to due process. The central role of the police as first responders has consistently been brought out by research in preserving crime scenes, gathering evidence, and commencing procedures that mold the outcome of the case (Borah, 2021; Hussain et al., 2024). All over the world, fair and timely investigations are perceived to best safeguard human rights and deter crime. Those countries that boast of efficient investigative systems backed by high-level forensic science, legal compliance, and accountability mechanisms have better conviction rates and improved public confidence in their justice systems (Daraz et al., 2012; Pyrek, 2010).

On the contrary, limited law enforcement countries come to face very hard moats to cross towards justice. This is because what Barak et al. (2024) and Lynes et al. (2024) hold - that the codified law and

institutional structures like police, judiciary, and prosecution have to work together to give rise to smooth rule of law. Any systemic malfunction of these institutions would cause a miscarriage to justice, especially in the case of police investigation being weak, tardy, or compromised. Today police efficiency does not get judged only on the basis of arrest rates, but also on integrity in investigation, rights respect, and success in prosecution (Baradaran Baughman, 2020; Hussain et al., 2025).

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In Pakistan also, this police investigation system has been criticized quite a bit for its inefficiency, procedural loopholes, and what it lacks in public view. The powers provided under the legal system within the Code of Criminal Procedure have given much room for police investigation power-from arrest and seizure to interrogations (Mahmood, 2021). However, in practice, these often differ from the standard. Scholars argue that much political interference, lack of training, corruption, and resource scarcity are serious weaknesses in the investigatory function of law enforcement agencies (Neudorf & Neudorf, 2017). The very low conviction rates, therefore, not only reflect judicial delays but also the inadequacies of investigations. In many cases, evidence is insufficient, or the FIRs have not been registered properly; hence, the confessions are inadmissible (Leo et al., 2012).

Such problems exist within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) because of the socio-political situation, tribal traditions, and issues with security that complement the problems existing in the province. Police officials in KP, according to Ali Shah and Hussain (2020), assign their functions mostly to very difficult terrains with the least availability of forensic and digital tools. The cultural constraints further aggravate the investigation processes, meager manpower, and limited infrastructure, making the delivery of justice delayed and corroding people's confidence in the state's ability to protect its citizens and punish wrongdoers (Khan et al., 2025). The case intensifies with a sharper focus on District Dir Lower. The place mostly is characterized by rural settlements, less literacy, and a more serious tribal influence, all of which constitute really serious challenges to law and order maintenance. Tons of political pressure have been dealt with by police officers, aside from retaliation from the community, the lack of basic forensic support, and societal resistance to cooperate with law enforcement. Few empirical studies demonstrate how such investigative inadequacies in these peripheral districts affect the prosecution outcomes and the public's trust. Local law enforcement relies on outdated techniques, and modern training or institutional oversight is absent, resulting in the production of flawed case handling, contributing to the wider problem of low conviction rates and increasing public disillusion with the whole justice system.

Research Gap Effective police investigation requires a great effort in studies at local and district levels to understand such challenges in underdeveloped regions like District Dir Lower. What is apparent, therefore, is that while there exist a lot of literatures on such; little have been done about 'grass-root level' investigations failings, and how these quasi-systems affect prosecution and conviction rates, particularly in rural Pakistan. The empirical gap refer particularly: a lack of data regarding the realities of police operation in District Dir Lower. Infrastructural barriers, socio-political constraints, and investigative loopholes can wreak havoc in the collective functioning of justice delivery.

Such crucial gaps this study intends to cover through a district-specific inquiry into the investigative inadequacies and consequences on justice outcomes. It adds a very localized perspective to the much-needed national discourse on criminal justice reform by opening up District Dir Lower, which would provide local police with a better understanding of their needs. It will further add policy recommendations strengthening the capacity of investigations across rural Pakistan in an effort to enhance prosecution success and public trust in the justice system.

## Statement of the Problem

Once a crime has occurred, police investigation is key in the criminal justice system, which plays an important role in giving justice to the victims and accused alike and maintaining law and order. In Pakistan, however, particularly in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and even more so in District Dir Lower, lack of effective police investigations further worsens the already-existing injustices. The codified

laws exist, including the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which fashioned the entire process of investigations. Just on paper, these are procedural bottlenecks, lack of training, constraints owing to inadequate resources, political interference, and a very low level of community trust, which mar the practical implementation of these laws. The scenario is more worrying in rural and marginalized districts such as Dir Lower, where unresolved criminal cases, flawed evidence collection, and low conviction rates have become the order of the day. Most of the time, misalignment with the expected results of investigation leads onto delay in justice and low public confidence on law enforcement agencies.

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The sole ground for carrying out this study is that it addresses an urgent and much-delayed concern within its immediate locality. Much has been written and debated at the policy level about police reforms in urban centers and even nationally, but relatively little has been done to address the specific locality-oriented rural and district-specific challenges faced by law enforcement agencies. Despite its socio-political peculiarities and very little developed infrastructure, Dir Lower proves convincing enough for looking into how the deficiencies in police investigations affect the entire criminal justice system. The study will focus on the ground issues facing investigative officers, such as poor forensic tools, lack of legal knowledge, and community support, which leads to poor case results. In this sense, the research aims at benefiting local and provincial policymakers forcing them to realize the need for site-specific interventions likely to boost investigative efficiency and ultimately increase conviction rates.

This is among the very few studies that have empirically investigated or will empirically investigate law enforcement activity within District Dir Lower. Unlike previous studies that have focused on the macro or urban framework, this research will embrace a micro-touch based on field data and firsthand experiences. The study will then benefit from mixed-method design in capturing both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of investigative shortfall, thus giving practicable and context-related recommendations for improvement. This localized approach covers the lacuna in academic literature and will shine light on a much-refined comprehension of police investigation challenges in rural Pakistan.

It comes from a professional curiosity as well as a moral obligation to cast a direct light on the grim experiences of those communities that are excluded from the reform agenda. To observe repeat acquittals, prolonged trial lives, and victims abandoning their

## Aim of the study

Critical awareness will be raised by this study that acquitting or considered innocent an accused person in a law court may not always reflect true justice served but rather, a systemic flaw in the criminal investigation and prosecution processes. Hence this study aims to make an exploratory study of District Dir Lower of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, wherein defective investigations, complainant disinterest or follow-through, poor recovery of evidence, compromises between parties, plea bargaining, bringing to bear threats and security challenges that witnesses are exposed to, adjournments, and no professionalism or expertise among investigating officers and public prosecutors contribute to convicting very few people. In addition, the overloading of public prosecutors and inadequate coordination of all investigative and legal entities would further derail the justice process. Examine the above factors and analyze them to show their effects on the credibility of the system of criminal justice and public trust and hence, with a general sense of justice in society. Last, however, the study promises to recommend actions context-specific and realistic in nature to improve investigative practice and prosecutorial efficiency to ensure that justice is not only done but seen to be done.

## **Materials and Methods**

## **Research Design**

This study is based on a quantitative cross-sectional design and investigates the factors contributing to low conviction rates in the criminal justice system of District Dir Lower, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan. According to Shagufta (2015), cross-sectional design is the ideal spider study for capturing the data from

a population at a single point in time. The approach allows for identifying patterns, relationships, and perceptions. Because the study is aimed at identifying specific systemic and procedural weaknesses that affect conviction outcomes, the design provides an efficient and exhaustive methodology to collect and analyze the data

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## **Study Setting**

The study was carried out at the Tehsil Courts Chakdara, situated in District Dir Lower, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Judging purposively, this site had a high number of cases concerning crimes and had real importance for the processes acting within the district legal and judicial acts. It also brings accessibility to many legal actors involved in criminal proceedings including complainants, police officials, public prosecutors, and private counsels.

# **Population and Target Population**

The full population of this study comprised 830 individuals: complainants (359), police officials (375), public prosecutors (3), and private counsels (93). The population of interest described above considered those directly involved in criminal justice processes at Tehsil Courts Chakdara. Such individuals function in many critical roles in criminal investigation and prosecution, rendering them ideal respondents for establishing factors leading to reduced conviction rates (see Table-1).

## Socio-economic and Demographic Features of the Participants

Participants belonged to a mix of socio-economic backgrounds and demographic profiles. Police officials included station house officers (SHOs), investigators, and junior officers. Complainants were typically victims or relatives of victims involved in pending or disposed cases. Public prosecutors and private counsels had varying years of legal experience and exposure to court procedures. Capturing this diversity helped in understanding the nuanced experiences and perceptions related to case outcomes.

## Sampling Procedures and Sample Size

A multi-stage sampling technique was employed. The first stage, purposively targeted Tehsil Courts Chakdara. Thereafter, stratified random sampling was applied in the second stage to select respondents proportionately from each category. According to Sekaran and Bougie (2016), for a population of 830, a representative sample will be 261 at a 95% confidence level and a 5% margin of error. This accounts for 112 complainants, 117 police officials, all 3 public prosecutors, and 29 private counsels. The overall sample frame are given as under:

**Table 1: Sampling Frame** 

| S.<br>No | District Dir Lower | Target population | Sample size | Sample Selection     |
|----------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------|----------------------|
| 1        | Complainants       | 359               | 112         | Stratified random    |
| 2        | Police Officials   | 375               | 117         | sampling through     |
| 3        | Public prosecutors | 3                 | 3           | proportionate method |
| 4        | Private counsel    | 93                | 29          | proportionate method |
| Total    |                    | 830               | 261         |                      |

Source: Tehsil Courts Chakdara Annual Report, 2022

## Methods of Data Collection

Data was collected by conducting structured interviews. A 5-point Likert Scale was used to indicate the degree of agreement and disagreement on statements concerning factors contributing to low conviction rates. This made sure that the responses could be standardized easily to allow for comparative statistical analysis. The tool set participants free to express their perceptions objectively, ensuring the reliability and validity of the data obtained.

## Reliability and Validity of the Tool

Internal consistency of the tool was measured using Cronbach's Alpha in SPSS. To ascertain the reliability of the tool, a pilot study was performed where a threshold value of 0.7 was considered acceptable. All

reliability results for the tool subscales exceeded this minimum, thus confirming the consistency of the tool. Validity was ensured through expert reviews and revisions depending on feedback from the practitioners in the legal field (Field, 2013).

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#### **Ethical Considerations**

Ethical protocols were strictly adhered to at various stages of the data collection. All participants consented to the study. Confidentiality was assured for the police officials, the complainants, and the legal professionals due to the sensitive nature of the information being shared. Participation was entirely voluntary, and respondents were allowed to withdraw from the study anytime they felt like it. Ethical guidelines recognize the research principles of honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of the participants.

## **Data Analysis**

The collected data were analyzed through SPSS, with bivariate analysis, including regression and correlation tests, was performed in determining the relationships that emerge between the variables. Multiple regression analysis, which is multivariate analysis, was used to measure the impact on the dependent variable, which is conviction rate, from independent variables such as defective investigation, witness threats, and lack of expertise.

#### **Results**

The regression analysis presented on Table 2 analyzed the effect of the police officials' proof in a case on the low conviction rate, which is one of the major areas of focus for this research concerning factors of convictions in criminal justice concerning Pakistan in Dir Lower, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

First, it must be understood that the constant of the regression model is the intercept, which is 29.531. This means that when the independent variable (i.e., police officials' inability to prove the truth) has a value of zero, the baseline conviction rate is 29.531. This baseline reflects the inherent conviction rate due to other factors that have not been accessed by direct means in the model.

The unstandardized coefficients show that the coefficient for "Police Officials Not Prove True" is 2.478, with a standard error of 0.544. This means that for each unit increase in the perceived inability of police officials to prove the truth, the conviction rate is expected to increase by 2.478 units. Given that the coefficient is positive, it indicates direct relation between police official's failure-prove-effective-case and increase in number of low conviction rates. The relationship corroborates with hypotheses of studies that poor police performance and inadequate presentation of evidence lead to lower convictions and higher acquittals.

Standardized coefficients (Beta) for variable "Police Officials Not Prove True" is 0.272. This tells us about how strong is the predictor variable (police officials' performance) and the dependent variable (low conviction rates). Beta, which is equal to 0.272, indicates that as the capacity of police officials to provide solid evidence decreases, probability for low conviction rate moderately increases. Therefore, it augments the argument of the study that police performance is a key determinant of conviction outcomes.

Then again, t-value for unstandardized coefficient is reported to be 37.520, to which a p-value of 0.000 is attached. Extremely high t-value and very low p-value imply that "Police Officials Not Prove True" has a significant effect on low conviction rates statistically. The p-value of .000 is less than 0.05, making it safe to confidently reject the null hypothesis that no relationship exists. Thus, there is strong evidence that inability of the police officials to prove the truth of the cases plays a major role in low conviction rates observed in Dir Lower, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

F-value of 20.744 with a corresponding p-value of 0.000 is indicative that the regression model as a whole is significantly different from zero. This proves the intended relationship between police officials' inability to prove cases and low conviction rates and boosts the fact that such relationship is not a matter of random chance but a very meaningful and impactful factor influencing the outcome of

criminal cases.

The value of R-square is equal to 0.074, meaning petition which has around 7.4 % of variation in low conviction rates is a consequence of the capacity of police officials not providing strong proof. Although this is a small percentage, it still shows how important police performance is because this obviously is just one of many factors, especially those not measured, that affect the overall conviction rates.

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The adjusted R-square is finally 0.071, which considers the number of predictors in the model so that when adjusting for the number of variables, about 7.1 % of the variance in conviction rates can still be explained by the inability of police to prove a case.

Last stated, such findings illustrate that the performance of police officials, in their prime ability to conduct effective investigations with a subsequent better presentation of the cases, is a viable factor influencing conviction rates in criminal trials. This is relevant to this study in that it emphasizes police performance as a main cause of low conviction rates in Dir Lower. Since police officials usually are the prime evidence sources cited by prosecutors in a criminal trial, a failure to properly investigate and present cases will more than likely yield an acquittal, which clearly resonates with the focus of this present argument on low conviction rates causes in the region.

Table 2: Regression Analysis of Police Officials Not Prove True

| Model                | Unstandardized                        | Coefficients     | Standardized          | Т            | Sig.   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|----------------------|---------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|--------------|--------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Constant             | В                                     | Std. Error       | Coefficients          |              | 3.8    |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                      |                                       |                  | Beta                  |              |        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Police Officials Not | 29.531                                | 0.787            | 0.272                 | 37.520       | 0.000  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Prove True           |                                       |                  |                       |              |        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                      | 2.478                                 | 0.544            |                       | 4.555        | 0.000  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                      | a. Dependent Variable: Low Conviction |                  |                       |              |        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                      |                                       | ANOVA            |                       |              |        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Model                | Sum of Squares                        | Df               | Mean Square           | F            | Sig.   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Regression           | 371.161                               | 1                | 371.161               | 20.744       | 0.000  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Residual             | 4634.108                              | 259              | 17.892                |              |        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total                | 5005.270                              | 260              |                       |              |        |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| a. Dependent Variabl | e: Low Conviction b. I                | Predictors: (Con | stant), Police Offici | als Not Prov | e True |  |  |  |  |  |  |

| a. Depe | a. Dependent Variable: Low Conviction b. Predictors: (Constant), Police Officials Not Prove True |          |                   |                            |  |  |  |  |  |
|---------|--|----------|-------------------|----------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
|         | Model Summary  |          |                   |                            |  |  |  |  |  |
| Model   | R  | R Square | Adjusted R Square | Std. Error of the Estimate |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1       | 1 0.272 0.074 0.071 4.230  |          |                   |                            |  |  |  |  |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant, Police Officials Not Prove True), b. Low Conviction

The relationship between the independent variable "Police Officials Not Prove True" and the dependent variable "Low Conviction Rate" has been presented in Table 3. A Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.272 causes the interpretation of a moderately positive relation between the low conviction rates and the inability of police officials to prove cases. This infers the inability of police officials to provide sufficient evidence and a low possibility of conviction outcome at the end.

For the p-value of 0.000, less than the standard significance level of 0.01, this suggests indeed that this correlation is statistically significant. Therefore, one can conclude fairly confidently that the performance of police will be significantly reflective of the rates at which convictions are recorded. This finding is vital to the study mainly for affirming the hypothesis of deficiency in the efficient proof of the police officials as a contributor to the low conviction rates. Hence, the study is primarily concerned about how the police performance acts as a determinant of criminal justice outcomes for Dir Lower, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan.

It indicates a high level of confidence in the correlation observed; it is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). If it was just random chance, then there would be no correlation. Thus, it is a true association

and not random chance increases credibility for the results, which adds to this finding being directly related to the study about police performance-with regard especially to those regarding proof during trials-affecting outcomes in the legal system regarding acquittals and low conviction rates.

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The total sample size of 261 confirms that the analysis is based on a strong number of observations, further strengthening the foundation for validity in the presented results. This adds credibility to the findings, as they are directly linked to the study's investigation on how police performance-particularly in terms of their ability to provide proof during trials-impacts outcomes in the legal system, such as acquittals and, as indicated by this study, low conviction rates.

Thus, a moderate yet statistically significant relationship is inferred between the incapacity of police officials to prove cases and low rates of conviction. This gives an extra boost to the thesis of the study concerning the place, measure, and role that deficiencies in police investigation and evidence presentation occupy as critical factors in the maintenance of low conviction rates, particularly in the context of criminal cases in Dir Lower, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

**Table 3: Correlation** 

| IV (Police Officials Not Prove  | Measure         | Police Officials      | Low Conviction |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| True) & DV (Low Conviction)     |                 | <b>Not Prove True</b> |                |
| Police Officials Not Prove true | Pearson         | 1                     | 0.272**        |
|                                 | Correlation     |                       |                |
|                                 | Sig. (2-tailed) |                       | 0.000          |
|                                 | N               | 261                   | 261            |
| Low Conviction Rate             | Pearson         | 0.272**               | 1              |
|                                 | Correlation     |                       |                |
|                                 | Sig. (2-tailed) | 0.000                 |                |
| Total                           | N               | 261                   | 261            |

<sup>\*\* (</sup>Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 4 illustrates the results obtained from the multiple regression analysis concerning the various independent variables that affect low conviction rates, especially in the light of police officials' inability to prove cases. The models were built in a stepwise manner; beginning with Model 1, which has only the police officials' performance; other more variables were gradually added-in first qualification, second the age of the respondent, and finally the monthly income/salary.

In Model 1, only one variable is found to be significant: "Police Officers Not Prove True", which has an unstandardized coefficient (B) of 2.478 with a standard error of 0.544. The relationship is significant, suggesting that if a case cannot be proven by police officials, there will be a lower conviction rate. Interestingly, the t-value of 4.555 was found to be statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000, implying that this particular variable significantly influences the dependent variable (low conviction). Of which failure to provide proof in cases upon their investigation by police significantly tilts the balance of probabilities in favor of acquitting the accused or placing him or her at risk of a low conviction, thus aligning with the study hypothesis on police performance being a direct influencing factor in criminal justice outcomes

In Model 2, the qualification of a police official is brought in as an additional control variable. The coefficient for Police Officers Not Prove True falls slightly to 2.372, while that for Qualification stands at 0.543, while being again statistically highly significant (t=4.361, p=0.000). This suggests that the education or training level of the police might contribute in their conviction outcomes. The implication is that higher conviction rates may result where more qualified police officials prove cases. Thus, the F-statistics of 20.601 and p-value of 0.000 confirm the significance of the model and its ability to explain some variance in low conviction rates.

Model 3 then adds "Age of Respondent" as a predictor. Further evidence for the trend of Police Officers

Not Prove Trues coefficient declining to 2.149 exists and is mirrored by a coefficient for Age of Respondent of -0.931, with a t-value of -4.793 and a p-value of 0.000. The negative sign here means that older respondents were less inclined to report low conviction rates, which raises the possibility of a generational effect on perceptions of the justice system. Once again, the model is statistically significant with an F statistic of 22.560, thus backing the view that age plays a role in the opinion on the efficacy of police and criminal justice system.

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In Model 4, a coefficient of -0.598 for "Monthly Income-Salary," with the t-value of -2.008 and significance of 0.046, indicated that lower monthly income or salary increases low conviction rates. This finding may suggest that people with lower monthly incomes may have difficulties in accessing justice or might rather be disadvantaged by ineffective police practices, which tend to raise the acquittal rates. The model is still statistically significant (F = 18.128).

The model summary shows the R-squared values slowly growing across the models, suggesting that the more variables are included, the more low conviction rate variance is explained. The R-squared in Model 1 is 0.074 but increases to 0.221 in Model 4, signifying that collectively, these four predictors-police performance, qualification, age of the respondent, and monthly income-explain roughly 22.1% of the variance in low conviction rates. Though this is not a big amount by any means, it can be said that these factors have an impact on whatever outcomes are being investigated.

The section on excluded variables takes this one step further under the impact of variables. In this case, qualification, age, and income stood the test and are thus included in the models-thankfully-for the sake of significance. Age and monthly income show a significant impact on conviction rates; others, after all, need not strongly contribute in the final models.

To summarize, the multiple regression results provide convincing evidence for the main hypothesis of the study that police performance, qualification, age, and income do significantly impact convictions. Therefore, it is suggested that there should be a basic change in the ability of police officials to successfully prove cases, in their qualifications, and to ameliorate low income situations that may be an important factor affecting conviction rates in Pakistan. Given these considerations, the study asserts that police training and socio-economic factors are of utmost importance in the criminal justice process while highlighting points for potential reform to help improve conviction rates.

Table 4 Multiple Regression Analysis for Police Officials Not Prove True

|   | Coefficients               |                |          |              |        |       |  |  |  |
|---|----------------------------|----------------|----------|--------------|--------|-------|--|--|--|
|   | Model                      | Unstandardized |          | Standardized | Т      | Sig.  |  |  |  |
|   |                            | Coefficie      | ents     | Coefficients |        |       |  |  |  |
|   |                            | В              | Standard | Beta         |        |       |  |  |  |
|   |                            |                | Error    |              |        |       |  |  |  |
|   | (Constant)                 | 29.531         | 0.787    |              | 37.520 | 0.000 |  |  |  |
| 1 | Police Officials Not Prove | 2.478          | 0.544    | 0.272        | 4.555  | 0.000 |  |  |  |
|   | True                       |                |          |              |        |       |  |  |  |
|   | (Constant)                 | 27.768         | 0.862    |              | 32.223 | 0.000 |  |  |  |
| 2 | Police Officials Not Prove | 2.372          | 0.527    | 0.261        | 4.503  | 0.000 |  |  |  |
|   | True                       |                |          |              |        |       |  |  |  |
|   | Qualification              | 0.543          | 0.124    | 0.252        | 4.361  | 0.000 |  |  |  |
|   | (Constant)                 | 30.419         | 0.995    |              | 30.567 | 0.000 |  |  |  |
| 3 | Police Officials Not Prove | 2.149          | 0.508    | 0.236        | 4.233  | 0.000 |  |  |  |
|   | True                       |                |          |              |        |       |  |  |  |
|   | Qualification              | 0.719          | 0.125    | 0.335        | 5.756  | 0.000 |  |  |  |
|   | Age of the Respondent      | -0.931         | 0.194    | -0.279       | -4.793 | 0.000 |  |  |  |

|          | (Constant)          |          | 30.678  | 0.998      |         |                | 30.749           | 0.000       |  |
|----------|---------------------|----------|---------|------------|---------|----------------|------------------|-------------|--|
| 4        | Police Officials No | ot Prove | 2.113   | 0.505      |         | 0.232          | 4.183            | 0.000       |  |
|          | True                |          |         |            |         |                |                  |             |  |
|          | Qualification       |          | 0.781   | 0.128      |         | 0.363          | 6.102            | 0.000       |  |
|          | Age of the Respor   | ndent    | -0.584  | 0.259      |         | -0.175         | -2.256           | 0.025       |  |
|          | Monthly Income/     | Salary   | -0.598  | 0.298      |         | -0.160         | -2.008           | 0.046       |  |
|          | 1                   |          | I.      | ANOV       | Ά       | 1              | •                |             |  |
|          | Model               | Sum of   | Squares | DF         |         | Mean           | F                | Sig.        |  |
|          |                     |          |         |            |         | Square         |                  |             |  |
|          | Regression          | 371.161  | L       | 1          |         | 371.161        | 20.744           | 0.000       |  |
| 1        | Residual            | 4634.10  | )8      | 259        |         | 17.892         |                  |             |  |
|          | Total               | 5005.27  | 70      | 260        |         |                |                  |             |  |
|          | Regression          | 689.269  | )       | 2          |         | 344.635        | 20.601           | 0.000       |  |
| 2        | Residual            | 4316.00  | )1      | 258        |         | 16.729         |                  |             |  |
|          | Total               | 5005.27  | 70      | 260        |         |                |                  |             |  |
|          | Regression          | 1043.36  | 58      | 3          |         | 347.789        | 22.560           | 0.000       |  |
| 3        | Residual            | 3961.90  | )1      | 257        |         | 15.416         |                  |             |  |
|          | Total               | 5005.27  | 70      | 260        |         |                |                  |             |  |
|          | Regression          | 1104.79  | 9       | 4          |         | 276.200        | 18.128           | 0.000       |  |
| 4        | Residual            | 3900.47  | 70      | 256        |         | 15.236         |                  |             |  |
|          | Total               | 5005.27  | 70      | 260        |         |                |                  |             |  |
|          |                     |          | N       | /lodel Sun | nmary   | ,              |                  |             |  |
| Model    | R                   | R Squar  | е       | Adjuste    | d R Sq  | uare           | Std. Error of th | e Estimate  |  |
| 1        | 0.272               | 0.074    |         | 0.071      |         |                | 4.230            | 30          |  |
| 2        | 0.371               | 0.138    |         | 0.131      |         |                | 4.090            |             |  |
| 3        | 0.457               | 0.208    |         | 0.199      |         |                | 3.926            |             |  |
| 4        | 0.470               | 0.221    |         | 0.209      |         |                | 3.903            |             |  |
|          |                     |          | Ex      | cluded Va  | ariable | es .           |                  |             |  |
| Model    |                     | Beta     | Т       | Sig        | Parti   | al Correlation | Collinearity     | Statistics/ |  |
|          |                     | In       |         |            |         |                | Tolerance        |             |  |
| 1. Age o | of the Respondent   | -0.180   | -3.053  | 0.003      | -0.18   | 37             | 0.995            |             |  |
| Qualific | cation              | 0.252    | 4.361   | 0.000      | 0.26    | 2              | 0.998            |             |  |
|          | ly Income/ Salary   | -0.148   | -2.498  | 0.013      | -0.15   | 54             | 0.996            |             |  |
| 2. Age o | of the Respondent   | -0.279   | -4.793  | 0.000      | -0.28   | 36             | 0.908            |             |  |
|          | ly Income/ Salary   | -0.280   | -4.673  | 0.000      | -0.28   | 30             | 0.859            |             |  |
| 3. M     | lonthly Income/     | -0.160   | -2.008  | 0.046      | -0.12   | 25             | 0.478            |             |  |
| Salary   |                     |          |         |            |         |                |                  |             |  |

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Table 5 summarizes findings from a regression analysis into the role defective investigations have played with regard to low convictions levels. The two variables are defective investigation-the independent variable and low conviction-the dependent variable. The results section comprises coefficients, Anova, and model summary.

The unstandardized coefficients show that for every increase in defective investigation unit, which would possibly mean faults or problems in the investigation process, the 'low conviction' increases by 3.720 units. It means that the rate of incidents where convictions are low becomes highly indicated whenever investigations become defective, as attested by 5.283 t-value, which is statistically significant

at p-value=0.000. The unstandardized coefficient of 28.635 for the constant indicates that, even when defective investigations do not occur, there is still a baseline level of low conviction; however, the value does not relate much too defective investigations.

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4.177

For standardized coefficients, it is married to mean that this moderates the amount of 0.312 between defective investigation and low conviction. The statistical significance of 0.000 (of p-value) further validates the above-mentioned fact that something really important about the influence of defective investigators on the dependent variable conviction rates is a statistical value and random to chance occurrences. It reflects how the flaws in the process of investigation will contribute largely to acquittal or leniency in convictions, as the study primarily focuses on how police and the best investigation work have an influence in the outcome of criminal justice.

The ANOVA results revealed that the overall model showed a significant regression: it had an F-statistic of 27.906 and a p-value of 0.000. Therefore, defective investigation is shown to be a significant predictor of low conviction and fits the data well in predicting a non-negligible amount of the variance in outcome due to low conviction.

The model summary reflects an R value of 0.312 which means that there is a definite moderate correlation between defective investigation and low conviction rate. The R-squared value indicates that defective investigation on its own explains 9.7% of the variance in low conviction rates, which is minor yet a valuable contribution in understanding the relationship. Adjusted R-squared value of 0.094, accounting for predictors in the model, is very much in agreement with the R-squared value further reinforcing the inference that defective investigation variable is one important and major influencing variable on conviction rates in the sample.

These results indicate that defects in investigations are major contributors toward low conviction levels and thereby affirm the premise of this study that investigative short-comings lead to the presentation of weak cases in courts resulting in higher acquittal or lower conviction levels. Need arises hence for improved investigative procedures and thereby training and resources for police within their workplaces.

Table 5: Regression Analysis of Defective Investigation

0.312

1

| Mo          | Model                                 |                                 | Unstandardized Coefficients |                   | Т            | Sig.  |  |  |  |  |
|-------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|--------------|-------|--|--|--|--|
| Con         | stant                                 | В                               | Std. Error                  | Coefficients      |              |       |  |  |  |  |
|             |                                       |                                 |                             | Beta              |              |       |  |  |  |  |
| Defective I | nvestigation                          | 28.635                          | 0.850                       | 0.312             | 33.696       | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |
|             |                                       | 3.720                           | 0.704                       |                   | 5.283        | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |
|             | a. Dependent Variable: Low Conviction |                                 |                             |                   |              |       |  |  |  |  |
|             | ANOVA                                 |                                 |                             |                   |              |       |  |  |  |  |
| Mo          | odel                                  | Sum of Squares                  | Df                          | Mean Square       | F            | Sig.  |  |  |  |  |
| Regr        | ession                                | 486.844                         | 1                           | 486.844           | 27.906       | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |
| Res         | idual                                 | 4518.426                        | 259                         | 17.446            |              |       |  |  |  |  |
|             |                                       |                                 |                             |                   |              |       |  |  |  |  |
| To          | otal                                  | 5005.270                        | 260                         |                   |              |       |  |  |  |  |
|             |                                       | 5005.270<br>w Conviction Rate k |                             | Constant), Defect | ve Investiga | ition |  |  |  |  |
|             |                                       | w Conviction Rate k             |                             | Constant), Defect | ve Investiga | tion  |  |  |  |  |

a. Predictors: (Constant, Defective Investigation), b. Low Conviction

0.094

0.097

Table-6 shows correlation analysis, involving the understandings of police investigation defects (independent variable) and below the conviction rates (dependent variable). Pearson results are computed on correlation and tested at the level of significance 0.01.

Pearson correlation coefficient for "Defects in Police Investigation" and "Low Conviction Rate" is 0.312,

thus signifying a modest but positive link between these two variables. This means with an increase in the defects in police investigation tends towards lowering the rate of conviction, which goes in lines with the finding of the study that flawed investigation greatly contributes lower conviction rates.

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Significance value (p-value) is 0.000, proving this correlation as statistically significant: the actual chances that such correlation is just an incidental one is very low. Validity of the relationship observed between defects in investigations and the low rates of conviction becomes highly backed with the p-value lower than 0.01. This solidifies the assertion that defects in investigative processes contribute to high contributing factors towards criminal case outcomes, especially in successful convictions.

Also the correlation of 0.312 and marked with two asterisks shows that this correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) and thus marks the significance and strength of the relationship between defective investigations and low conviction rates.

The N value is 261, which indicates the number of observations made for analysis and also makes this sample size further enhance the genuineness of empirical evidence of confidence.

These findings suggest that defective investigations, such as wrong evidence collection, procedural mistakes, or failures to follow proper investigation protocols, correlate strongly with lower conviction rates. Highlighting the importance of the quality of police investigations in ensuring an adequate and fair criminal justice outcome, the study illustrates the need for optimizing investigative procedures as a means of reducing incidences of low conviction.

**Table 6: Correlation** 

| IV (Defects in Investigation) & DV | Measure             | Defects in    | Low Conviction |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------|
| (Low Conviction Rate)              |                     | Investigation |                |
| Flaws in Police Investigation      | Pearson Correlation | 1             | 0.312**        |
|                                    | Sig. (2-tailed)     |               | 0.000          |
|                                    | N                   | 261           | 261            |
| Low Conviction                     | Pearson Correlation | 0.312**       | 1              |
|                                    | Sig. (2-tailed)     | 0.000         |                |
| Total                              | N                   | 261           | 261            |

<sup>\*\* (</sup>Significant Correlation is observed at 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 7 shows the outcomes of a multiple regression analysis on the nexus of flaws in police investigation (independent variable) and low conviction rates (dependent variable). The analytical model is extended with some other variables, viz. qualification, age of the respondent, and monthly income/salary.

Flaw in police investigation" had an unstandardized coefficient of 3.720, a standard error of 0.704, standardized coefficient (Beta) of 0.312, and a t-value of 5.283 at 0.000 level of significance in the first model. The finding of these statistics indicates that flaws in police investigations have a significant positive impact with respect to the low conviction rate meaning that as investigations have more flaws, the conviction rates are likely to deteriorate. Along these lines, an additional regression analysis has shown that these flaws will account for 9.7 percent variation in low conviction rates as reflected by an R-square of 0.097.

The next model adds a Respondent Qualification variable together with flaws in investigation. Now "Flaws in Police Investigation" has an unstandardized coefficient of 3.615, Beta value of 0.304, and a t-value of 5.312, still significant at the 0.000 level. This suggests that, after controlling for the qualifications of the respondents, flaws in police investigations still exercise a significant positive effect on low conviction rates. The addition of "Qualification" shows a coefficient of 0.546 (unstandardized) with Beta values of 0.254 and a t-value of 4.451, which are significant in the 0.000 level. This means that more income is associated with minor improvements in conviction rates. The additional increase in R-square value to 16.2% shows that the model now accounts for a larger share of the variance in low

conviction rates than the first model.

The third model introduces the variable "Age of the Respondent." The unstandardized coefficient value for "Flaws in Police Investigation" is now 3.902, and the Beta standardized remains significant at 0.327 with a t-value of 6.073. The coefficient for "Age of the Respondent" is -1.093 (unstandardized), with a Beta of -0.328 and a t-value of -5.829, which is significant at the 0.000 level. The negative nature indicates that older respondents are less likely to report having low conviction rates due to their somewhat experienced perspective concerning the system of law. The analyst found the R-squared value improved to 26.0% with the addition of "Age of the Respondent," signifying that the aspect presently accounts for a much larger portion of the variance in low conviction rates.

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The fourth model introduces another variable called "Monthly Income/Salary." It bears an unstandardized coefficient for "Flaws in Police Investigation" equal to 3.856 with a standardized Beta of 0.323 and a t-value of 6.032. It cuts across all indications proving that flaws in police investigation have a positive effect on a low conviction rate. The coefficient for "Qualification" jumps to 0.808 with a Beta of 0.376 and a t-value of 6.547, confirming the earlier indication that higher qualification entails higher conviction rates. "Age of the Respondent" still depicts a negative coefficient (-0.755, Beta = -0.227) and a t-value of -3.008, indicating that older respondents generally feel the issue with conviction less than younger respondents do. "Monthly Income/Salary" bears a negative coefficient of -0.580 (unstandardized), Beta of -0.155, and a t-value of -2.013, indicating that the lower income is associated with lesser conviction. The R-squared value increased slightly to 27.1% which shows that the model explains little bit more variation of low conviction rates.

The ANOVA results from all models indicated that the regression models, if any, are statistically significant at p-values 0.000, confirming the meaningful relationship that each model has with the dependent variable (low conviction rates) for the predictors in that model.

Regarding collinearity, statistics tolerance values indicate that there is no significant multicollinearity problem among these variables, as all these tolerance values are above 0.9 and validate the regression analysis.

Overall, the findings of the multiple regression tests suggest that flaws in police investigations, respondent qualifications, age, and income all play a vital role in explaining the changes in low conviction rates. This has proven that deficiencies of police investigation are a major contributor to lower conviction rates and that this is where education, age, and income moderated effects manifest, all reflective of more extensive socio-economic conditions that affect charges within such a system. These findings call for an overhaul in investigation procedures and deeper insight into socio-economic issues while dealing with conviction rates for the justice system.

Table 7: Multiple Regression Analysis for Flaws in police investigation

|   | Coefficients  |        |                |              |              |        |       |  |  |
|---|---------------|--------|----------------|--------------|--------------|--------|-------|--|--|
|   | Model         |        | Unstandardized | Coefficients | Standardized | Т      | Sig.  |  |  |
|   |               |        |                |              | Coefficients |        |       |  |  |
|   |               |        | В              | Standard     | Beta         |        |       |  |  |
|   |               |        |                | Error        |              |        |       |  |  |
|   | (Constant)    |        | 28.635         | 0.850        |              | 33.696 | 0.000 |  |  |
| 1 | Flaws in      | Police | 3.720          | 0.704        | 0.312        | 5.283  | 0.000 |  |  |
|   | Investigation |        |                |              |              |        |       |  |  |
|   | (Constant)    |        | 26.837         | 0.915        |              | 29.345 | 0.000 |  |  |
| 2 | Flaws in      | Police | 3.615          | 0.680        | 0.303        | 5.312  | 0.000 |  |  |
|   | Investigation |        |                |              |              |        |       |  |  |
|   | Qualification |        | 0.546          | 0.123        | 0.254        | 4.451  | 0.000 |  |  |

|                | (Constant)    |        | 29.281     | 0.958     |             | 30.571       | 0.000       |
|----------------|---------------|--------|------------|-----------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| 3              | Flaws in I    | Police | 3.902      | 0.643     | 0.327       | 6.073        | 0.000       |
|                | Investigation |        |            |           |             |              |             |
|                | Qualification |        | 0.749      | 0.121     | 0.348       | 6.210        | 0.000       |
|                | Age of        | the    | -1.093     | 0.188     | -0.328      | -5.829       | 0.000       |
|                | Respondent    |        |            |           |             |              |             |
|                | (Constant)    |        | 29.532     | 0.960     |             | 30.754       | 0.000       |
| 4              | Flaws in I    | Police | 3.856      | 0.639     | 0.323       | 6.032        | 0.000       |
|                | Investigation |        |            |           |             |              |             |
|                | Qualification |        | 0.808      | 0.123     | 0.376       | 6.547        | 0.000       |
|                | Age of        | the    | -0.755     | 0.251     | -0.227      | -3.008       | 0.003       |
|                | Respondent    |        |            |           |             |              |             |
|                | •             | ome/   | -0.580     | 0.288     | -0.155      | -2.013       | 0.045       |
|                | Salary        |        |            |           |             |              |             |
|                |               | ı      |            | ANOVA     |             |              |             |
|                | Model         | Sum    | of Squares | DF        | Mean        | F            | Sig.        |
|                |               |        |            |           | Square      |              |             |
|                | Regression    | 486.8  |            | 1         | 486.844     | 27.906       | 0.000       |
| 1              | Residual      | 4518   |            | 259       | 17.446      |              |             |
|                | Total         | 5005   |            | 260       |             |              |             |
|                | Regression    |        | 809.006    |           | 404.503     | 24.870       | 0.000       |
| 2              | Residual      | 4196   |            | 258       | 16.265      |              |             |
|                | Total         | 5005   |            | 260       |             |              |             |
|                | Regression    | 1298   |            | 3         | 432.991     | 30.024       | 0.000       |
| 3              | Residual      | 3706   |            | 257       | 14.421      |              |             |
|                | Total         | 5005   |            | 260       |             |              |             |
|                | Regression    | 1356   |            | 4         | 339.188     | 23.799       | 0.000       |
| 4              | Residual      | 3648   |            | 256       | 14.252      |              |             |
|                | Total         | 5005   |            | 260       |             |              |             |
|                | T             |        | Mod        | del Summa | ary         |              |             |
| Model          | R             | R Squ  | iare       | Adjuste   | ed R Square | Std. Error   | of the      |
|                |               |        |            |           |             | Estimate     |             |
| 1              | 0.312         | 0.097  |            | 0.094     |             | 4.177        |             |
| 2              | 0.402         | 0.162  |            | 0.155     |             | 4.033        |             |
| 3              | 0.509         | 0.260  |            | 0.251     |             | 3.798        |             |
| 4              | 0.521         | 0.271  |            | 0.260     |             | 3.775        |             |
|                |               | 1      |            | ded Varia | 1           |              |             |
| Model          |               | Beta   | In T       | Sig       | Partial     | Collinearity | Statistics/ |
|                |               |        |            |           | Correlation | Tolerance    |             |
|                | age of the    | -0.22  | 7 -3.937   | 0.000     | -0.238      | 0.993        |             |
| Respon         |               |        |            | 1         |             |              |             |
| -              | fication      | 0.254  |            | 0.000     | 0.267       | 0.999        |             |
| Mont<br>Salary | •             | -0.17  | 7 -3.035   | 0.003     | -0.186      | 0.999        |             |
| 2. A           | ge of the     | -0.32  | 8 -5.829   | 0.000     | -0.342      | 0.910        |             |
|                |               |        | •          |           |             | •            |             |

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| Respondent             |        |        |       |        |       |
|------------------------|--------|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Monthly Income/ Salary | -0.311 | -5.338 | 0.000 | -0.316 | 0.865 |
| 3. Monthly Income/     | -0.155 | -2.013 | 0.045 | -0.125 | 0.478 |
| Salary                 |        |        |       |        |       |

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## **Discussion**

The study reveals that the effectiveness of police officials in establishing the facts during criminal trials is the pivotal factor affecting conviction rates across the board in Dir Lower, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The study found that the evidence presented ineffectively by police officers significantly affects the conviction rates, and this is supported by the statistical evidence of regression analyses, in line with prior empirical studies like Khan et al. (2025) and Iqbal et al. (2023), which also highlighted the ways in which investigative shortcomings and procedural flaws within Pakistan's law enforcement cause cases to fail.

The modeling also detected moderate predictive strength of the police evidential performance on conviction trends; this supports Leipold (2005), which maintains that poor preparation of cases and failures to meet evidentiary thresholds often led to acquittals, especially in settings where institutions are weak. The findings lend support to Roberts and Herrington (2013) theoretical proposition that front-line policing practices have an effect on judicial outcomes in low-trust criminal justice environments.

Actual perpetrators were not arrested by the police because of defective investigation in America. This reflects the view of Paul (2023) that systemic flaws in investigative processes essentially weaken cases in their prosecution, thus leading to indulgence and even dismissals by the courts. Likewise, Ikunda (2016) have espoused the idea that bad investigations are directly correlated with acquittals, especially in cases that are not buttressed by technical evidence.

The addition of socio-demographic variables brought into the regression model, along with education level of police officers, indicates that more educated police officers tend to achieve higher conviction rates. This concurs with the findings of Orrick (2008), which state that training and education of police officers enhance their capacity to build up cases, thus requiring institutional reform in recruitment and training to enhance conviction reliability.

Respondent age and income were also shown to influence perceptions and experiences of the justice system. Older adults were found to perceive conviction rates less critically, a position consistent with that of Walker (2012), who found generational shifts in the trust placed in judicial institutions. Furthermore, lower-income people experience greater injustice, likely due to systemic hurdles in the way of availing legal support, thus corroborating the findings of Siddiqui (2025) regarding class-based differences in justice delivery in rural Pakistan.

Furthermore, correlation analyses substantiate the profound relationship that lackluster police investigations have with conviction outcomes, a fact corroborated by Wilson et al. (2010), who conclude that the integrity of investigations is the linchpin in the success of prosecutions. Nonexistence of multicollinearity between variables validates the strength of the regression models in support of the credibility of the findings.

This research not only reconfirms previously established links between police investigative performance and conviction outcomes but also takes the discussion into wholly original terrains, unlike prior studies. Previous research (empirical evidences used in the discussion) has frequently been qualitative or urban in focus, with this study providing quantitative evidence from a rural district (Dir Lower) that has received rare, in-depth attention.

These layered regression models of the study-incrementally bringing in variables like qualification, age, and income-towards a nuanced informant of the relationships between socio-demographics and effectiveness in the courts, which feature sparsely in the Pakistani criminological literature. This

integrative approach is at variance with the narrow focus on a few variables typical of earlier analyses. Also unique is that this study will examine both procedural (investigative flaws) and personal (qualifications, perceptions) simultaneously, thereby portraying a fuller picture of how institutional failures coincide with societal realities to bring about adverse legal outcomes. Previous studies have examined these two kinds of elements separately; this combination in one model creates a broader explanatory framework for the inquiry.

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#### **Conclusion**

Some major insights into the criminal justice system in Dir Lower, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, have emerged from the regression analysis into the impact exerted by police officials on the proof of cases and the resulting conviction rates. The analysis indicates that police officials' performance in proving the cases directly affects conviction outcomes, indicating that poor police performance leads to low conviction rates. Specifically, the result suggests that when police do not provide reliable evidence, low conviction rates are more likely, thus underscoring the importance of police investigations in the pursuit of justice. The result also showed that police qualifications, such as education or training, can significantly contribute to conviction outcomes. The findings suggest that the more qualified the police, the more likely the chances of conviction, hence some serious consideration should be directed toward creating proper educational and training institutes for the police. Another approach was the age, whereby the older the respondent was, the less inclined they were to report low conviction rates; this kind of trend may indicate a generational division in perceptions of the justice system.

The findings indicate that socio-economic aspects such as monthly income do affect conviction rates; the very low-income members of society tend to experience lower conviction rates likely due to lack of access to justice or the impact of poorly functioning police investigative techniques. The analysis strengthens the argument that faulty investigations carried out by the police are significant predictors of low conviction rates: the more faulty the investigations, the more probable that convictions will be low, thus necessitating efficient police work in order to dispense justice.

## Recommendations

As derived from the present study, there arise several recommendations for improving conviction rates with the professional effectiveness of both police and the criminal justice system at a wider dimension in Dir, Lower, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The foremost requirement in this aspect is the continuous training and development programs oriented toward enhancing the investigation skills of police officers, especially in gathering and presenting valid evidence regarding criminal cases. Thus, strengthening the capacity of police officials through specialized trainings in forensic sciences, evidence handling, and legal procedures will immensely contribute toward raising the level of investigations and chances of conviction. In addition, enhancement of police officers' educational qualifications in criminal justice and related fields should be prioritized to ensure a more competent and cultivated police force.

To this end, police agencies must purchase some modern equipment for investigative purposes that will assist in collecting evidence or analyzing the case further. Digital equipment, forensic tools, and enhanced case management systems will considerably guarantee the thoroughness and accuracy of investigations. This, in turn, will increase the chances of attaining evidence substantiating successful prosecutions.

The study accentuates the socio-economic factors affecting the conviction rate, leading to a conclusion that individuals from lower-income categories face hurdles in gaining access to justice. In this respect, the solution to the problem is to take measures that will promote equality of access to the courts for all, including the provision of legal aid to the indigent and the removal of obstacles that impede access to the court process. In addition, community outreach initiatives should help build relationships of trust between police and community members, which will lead individuals of all social classes to feel comfortable enough to report crime and participate in the justice system.

When we finally draw the line will be a cure to the ills of police investigations. There is also a need to look beneath the surface, at the examination and adjudication processes that are being employed, to be able to identify and address any systemic failure. A periodic review and triggers for accountability are needed so immunity and investigations are seriously and honestly addressed. These responses along with service professional's account and access to justice can contribute to a sound and fair criminal justice in achieving the (Dir lower, Pakistan) high conviction rates.

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#### **Limitations and Future Directions**

Several limitations of the study need to be taken into consideration while planning future work in this area. First, cross-sectional design does not enable establishing causal relationships between factors affecting rates of conviction, which could have resulted in valuable longitudinal research to assess the effects of long-term changes and various interventions on criminal justice systems. Future improvements should also include judicial practices, legal reforms, public perceptions of the justice system, and police effectiveness with socio-economic factors that the research focused on. Another limitation is the use of self-reported measures subject to bias by social desirability or recall issues. Future research could go for objective measures (court records or police reports) to vet the findings. Furthermore, this study was limited to Dir Lower and doesn't really represent the broader picture of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa nor of any region elsewhere in Pakistan. The future study can be conducted with a large sample from multiple districts for better generalizability. Finally, although the present study generates potential challenges, it did not evaluate the effectiveness of already existing policies or interventions aimed at improving conviction rates. In this way, future research can assess the outcome of specific reforms or interventions for the actionable understanding of the policymakers.

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